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Summary 
 
In this thesis, I address Bernard Stiegler’s text ‘The Discrete Image.’ I analyse its 
key argument that a new visual literacy is given by digital technology and that consumers 
of images will be able to critically apprehend images and even synthesise new ones. 
Stiegler argues that the inscription of images with discrete units or pixels implies the 
possibility of reading and analysing images in the same way that writing made speech 
and thought analysable. I suggest that Stiegler’s arguments for these future possibilities 
of digital technology are based on a general process relating man and technics that he 
conceives. This is the process by which all technics open future possibilities by 
constituting the past and rendering it accessible. With digital technology formal and other 
regularities of the visible world (and images) are constituted and this results in the 
possibility of a new kind of perception.  
But if we consider the contexts of consumer society and the history of digital 
technology the massive impediments to the realisation of such possibilities come to light. 
The mediated realities of the consumer world are not only targeting behaviours, but are 
more actively altering the fundamental human faculties of attention, perception, thought 
and memory. As a result of which the facts about humans may well have changed 
rendering Stiegler’s hope for human visual intelligence untenable.  
On the other hand, technologies of the post-War era come inscribed with the 
language of control and visions of closed worlds suited for control and total 
predictability. One consequence of which is that the design of modern technology betrays 
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a unilateral focus on total automaticity. I contend that this history of technology can be 
seen as giving the possibility of Stiegler’s own thinking on technics and their self-
evolving status. But the same however does not fare well for the hope that such 
technology will yield new perceptual possibilities for humans.  I argue that in relation to 
both the contexts mentioned of humans (consumers) and technology today the 
possibilities of digital technology that Stiegler conceives appear implausible at best.  
In the epilogue, I propose a mode of artistic creation as a means of achieving a 
transformed perception and visual literacy. Techne in Heidegger’s sense or the productive 
act of poesis (creation) names this modality in which the human surpasses the knowledge 
of his time, fulfills the debt of the past and in doing so opens up future possibilities.  




In 1997, IBM's custom built chess playing supercomputer Deep Blue defeated the 
reigning world Champion and one of the greatest chess players of all human history, 
Garry Kasparov. This was heralded by many as the birth of an era of superior artificial 
intelligence and a historic triumph of machine over man. This supercomputer could 
calculate 200 million possible moves on the chess board every second.1 Notably, this was 
double the capacity of the first model of Deep Blue that Kasparov had defeated the 
previous year.2 The new improved version was carrying out brute number crunching to 
search as thoroughly as possible and match accordingly, with an advantage of speed. Not 
surprisingly, Deep Blue’s searches included moves that would not even be considered by 
a novice chess player. A member of the team that built Deep Blue explained that the team 
had spent a year letting the machine repeatedly suffer defeat at the hands of another chess 
grandmaster. The mistakes made in each of these defeats were painstakingly fixed in a 
process that, he admitted, was “a bit clunky.”3  
This is also the kind of exhaustive if unremarkable labor expended in the creation 
of digital images. Images cannot be rendered from discrete numerical values without the 
work of calculating the “overdetermined” set of relations each pixel bears to at least eight 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Patricia A. Carpenter and Marcel Adam Just, “Computational Modeling of High-Level Cognition versus   
Hypothesis Testing, The Nature of Cognition, ed. Robert J. Sternberg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999)  
248. 
2  Ibid. 
3  David B. Fogel, Evolutionary Computation: Toward a New Philosophy of Machine Intelligence, 3rd ed.     
(New Jersey: The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, 2006)  10. 
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of its “neighbors.”4 This is “what makes images into images in the first place.”5  Any 
algorithm that aims to filter, process or recognise objects in a digital image has to resort 
to similar computations. It is no wonder that building up images from pixels is described 
as “slow, time-consuming and often unnecessary.”6 
 
In ‘The Discrete Image,’ Bernard Stiegler argues that consumers will soon be able 
to critically and analytically access images as a result of digitisation. For Stiegler, the 
inscription of images with pixels - a kind of alphabet of the visible world - implies the 
possibility of describing various forms, objects and other regularities that occur in 
images. Spectators will as a result be able to read and apprehend such regularities in the 
images and the visible world. And since reading implies the ability to write they would 
also be able to synthesise new images. The analysis of digital images using various 
algorithms and software will also have epistemological consequences for sciences and 
arts and these in turn will revolutionise visual literacy.  
But the analysis and apprehension of the visual world in relation to its formal 
aspects, the transformation of perception and the articulation of new intentions have long 
been the prerogatives of visual art. Artists seek to inscribe the visible world with modest 
tools such as brushes and make it available for analysis and synthesis through their 
inscriptions. The question to be asked is - why one needs an unwieldy and largely 
unintelligent mechanism for achieving the ends of art?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Friedrich Kittler, "Computer Graphics: A Semi-Technical Introduction," The Grey Room 2 (2009) 34. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Steve Jones, ed., Encyclopedia of New Media: an Essential Reference to Communication and 
Technology (California: Sage, 2003) 1964. 
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It is not incidental that ‘The Discrete Image’ was written and given as an address 
to art students and artists who could appreciate the idea of visual literacy. The appeal of 
Stiegler’s propositions is undeniable for his audience and for the rest of humanity. And 
yet his arguments seem to unproblematically repeat technological claims about 
digitisation without critically considering their actualities. Proclamations of the superior 
intelligence of Deep Blue similarly overlook the workings of the supercomputer and the 
nature of its intelligence. In the absence of such considerations, Stiegler’s text is too 
easily aligned with the rhetoric of technology evangelists and their optimistic hyperbole 
of an enlightened techno-given future.  
A philosopher of considerable and growing influence in Europe as well as the 
English-speaking world, Stiegler is widely read in disciplines such as critical theory, 
cultural studies, technology and media studies. As an intellectual activist Stiegler has 
consistently addressed issues pertaining to human culture and knowledge in light of new 
technologies and its implications. His establishment and initiation of institutions such as 
Ars Industrialis and the Institute for research and (technological) innovation in the Center 
Pompidou in Paris further testify to his commitment to these issues. In his life and 
thinking Stiegler continues to confront the question of humanity in its relation to modern 
technology. 
There is perhaps a more important reason why I have felt compelled to consider 
‘The Discrete Image.’ The need for a visual literacy and an intelligent means for 
accessing images is perhaps most critical and urgent today when our perception is 
grappling with an inundation of images. ‘The Discrete Image’ sets out the necessity of 
such a visual literacy and offers a glimpse of its potency. The possibility of an intelligent 
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and transformed perception is the key concern of Stiegler’s text but it is also one whose 
discussion is precluded at the same time that it is stated, owing in part to the 
overwhelming emphasis on technological possibilities. In this thesis, I aim to address this 




Modern technologies inherit the legacy of the Cold War and its language of total 
control, predictability and a concomitant “distrust of the human.”7 Contemporary 
sciences including robotics, neuroscience, AI, and the vast field of computational 
sciences have acquired a strong strain of this anti-humanism. For instance, in the building 
of man-machine weapon systems and in computer systems design it is an accepted truism 
that the “human” is the weakest link. And systems are often built with the intent of over-
riding human faculties in the interest of securing the best results. Digital technology 
partakes of this particular history of technology. 
The mass dissemination of digital technology occurs in the 1990s. This is the 
same decade when ‘The Discrete Image’ is written. This is also the context in which 
neuroscience comes to prominence with the 90’s being designated as the ‘decade of the 
brain.’ Meanwhile findings of psychology and the new brain sciences are being 
instrumentally applied to media and advertising with ever greater effect and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Norbert Weiner, Invention: The Care and Feeding of Ideas  (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993)  89. 
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systematicity. Aided with the potent ubiquity of digital technologies and the incisive 
findings of cognitive science, contemporary media industries are quite literally waging a 
war for the attentions and emotions of consumers. 
Contexts such as these have a direct bearing on the discussion of  ‘The Discrete 
Image.’ In this thesis, I consider different scenarios of consumer society and the context 
of the historical development of modern technology in order to situate and study 
Stiegler’s propositions. For instance, Stiegler contends that technics provide humans with 
new possibilities by rendering the past accessible. Writing records the flow of speech. 
Such a return of the past addresses the reader through a book for instance and allows him 
to analyse the writer’s thought and even synthesise new ones. Websites like Youtube 
today offer recommendations or options - videos and other consumer goods, to users that 
are based on the past visits of the specific user that have been recorded and analysed for 
regularities by a software program. The program accesses the past and synthesizes new 
options based on the analysis of this past. Such juxtapositions of scenarios with Stiegler’s 
proposals serve two purposes in my analysis. They expand the understanding of 
Stiegler’s terms by extending them in other directions. And they reveal the limitations of 
Stiegler’s arguments for digital technology presented in ‘The Discrete Image.’ 
The structure of this thesis is such that it begins and culminates with a discussion 
of the terms and key arguments of ‘The Discrete Image.’ The first chapter provides a 
close reading of ‘The Discrete Image.’ It establishes the terms of the discussion that are 
opened up and explicated in the course of many departures from the text in chapters 2 and 
3. In the epilogue, I revert to the question of visual literacy posed by ‘The Discrete 
Image’ to offer a positive account of how it may be realised.  
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III 
In the first chapter of the thesis, I explain Stiegler’s key argument in ‘The 
Discrete Image’ with respect to a general process that relates man and technics and which 
is at the core of Stiegler’s philosophy. This process, I argue, provides the basis for 
conceiving the hopeful future for contemporary digital technology. Technics are 
conceived by Stiegler as the means by which the past (speech, sound, gesture, experience 
and knowledge) is both constituted and transmitted over time. And human possibilities 
(future) are given in advance and over-determined by technical processes such as writing 
that inscribe and transmit the past. Technics, in Stiegler’s understanding, give us our 
heritage and our hope for a future by the same token. This process of the giving of the 
past and of the simultaneous over-determination of future possibilities by technical 
processes is what I call technicisation. 
The second chapter juxtaposes this concept of technicisation alongside the 
rhetoric of the brain sciences and scenarios from the contemporary consumer world. I 
choose these because of their contextual relevance and because they share certain tropes 
that are well aligned with Stiegler’s conceptions. The resulting comparisons bring to light 
some of the problems with Stiegler’s discourse and his overweening optimism about 
digital technology. In the third chapter, I compare Stiegler’s conception of technics with 
the form of post-war technology. This reveals the conditions and inscriptions that may 
have (over) determined Stiegler’s terms and conceptions. A brief, selective history of 
technology in the post-War era is also used to illustrate further problems with the 
realisation of the possibilities of digital technology that Stiegler puts forward.  
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In the epilogue I consider the possibilities of new intentions, transformed 
perception and visual intelligence. I propose how these could come about through a 
particular mode of artistic creation that surpasses the limits and structures of one’s time 
while realising the debt of the past.  
 
The summative argument presented here is that though the possibility of a new 
intelligent and critical perception is theoretically undeniable, it is not one that will be 
granted by digital technology itself. And the process of tehcnicisation by which such an 
outcome would come about may itself have been rendered obsolete by the over-
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Chapter 1: Stiegler’s ‘The Discrete Image’: A consideration of future possibilities 
 
In ‘The Discrete Image’ Stiegler argues that spectators (or consumers) will soon 
be able to critically and analytically apprehend images. Digitisation, he contends, is a 
form of inscription akin to alphabetic writing with a “system of traces” or “discrete 
elements” – pixels.8 And the alphabetisation or discretisation of images implies that 
spectators will “read” and analyse images just as people read and understand books 
(language) after writing had been invented.9  
Stiegler proposes that in the place of the earlier relation to the analog photograph 
in which the image appeared as a remnant of a past moment, digital technology provides 
the possibility of analysing this past seen in a photograph. This analysis would be carried 
out with various algorithms of image analysis.10 Through such analysis, Stiegler argues, 
“(digitisation) opens the possibility of new knowledges of the image- artistic as well as 
theoretical and scientific.”11 Significantly, the various knowledges about images would 
inform the new visual literacy among spectators.12 In other words, knowledges produced 
by image analysis would inform the spectators’ “reading” of images so that a new visual 
“intelligence” will become possible.13 This is how the “gaze” of the spectator is said to be 
transformed into one that is “more knowing” and “less credulous.”  The above is the key 
argument that Stiegler puts forward in ‘The Discrete Image.’  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8   Bernard Stiegler, “The Discrete Image,” Echographies of Television: Filmed Interviews, trans. Jennifer 
Bajorek (Cambridge: Polity, 2002)  162.	  
9   Ibid. 163.	  
10  Ibid. 161.	  
11 Ibid. 157.	  
12 Ibid. 162.	  
13 Ibid. 162. 
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As consumers would be able to synthesise or create images of their own with 
digital technology, Stiegler argues also that there is a real opportunity of modifying the 
traditional opposition of ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’ in industrial societies.14 The 
inscription of images with discrete elements implies both reading and writing capacities 
that can convert passive consumption into active production. Digitisation would then 
entail political possibilities of overcoming the consumer-producer divide through critique 
(or reading) and through creation (or writing). 
Stiegler contends that these analytical and synthetic possibilities are 
fundamentally implied in the very nature of the digital photograph and the way that it is 
produced. He suggests that digitisation allows for differentiated access to the newly 
inscribed discrete elements (or pixels) of the image.15 Image analysis using algorithms is 
possible because of this access. In so far as the analysis of digital images will follow 
specific algorithms and the forms described in them, the “grammatical operator” of the 
new visual literacy, or the operator that will describe and invent the grammatical rules of 
reading images, is technology.16 For Stiegler then, not only is the possibility of the new 
relation to the image technologically given (or implied in the nature of digitisation), it is 
also going to be carried out in relation to conditions given by technology, particularly that 
of computational analysis.  
Crucially, Stiegler does not simply argue that the change in the spectator’s 
relation to the image is possible, but that the “gaze” of the spectator “necessarily ends up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Ibid. 163.	  
15  Ibid. 154.	  
16  Ibid. 161. 
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progressively transformed.”17 At the beginning of the text too, Stiegler states that he will 
specify “what is happening” to the digital image and by the same token what is also 
happening to the perceived image or the “mental-image” implying that changes in the 
technologies that produce images necessarily entail changes in human perception.18 In 
general, Stiegler conceives any technological change as the harbringer of new human 
possibilities. This is a central premise of Stiegler’s philosophy.  
Technics such as writing or photography, in Stiegler’s thesis, give the means by 
which inheritances of a past (memory) are given. This inherited past indebts humans 
beyond their autonomy and gives the conditions of their existence, their avenues of 
knowledge and their possibilities of futures as well. In this way all technics create an 
advance on human possibilities and are said to over-determine them. It is on the basis of 
this process that Stiegler conceives new possibilities of perception or intelligent seeing as 
given by digitisation. 
In this chapter I will argue that the radical possibilities proposed in ‘The Discrete 
Image’ are based on such a process that underlies the general relation between man and 
technics in Stiegler’s philosophy.  Firstly, I will explain how the relation of man and 
technics in Stiegler’s thought is expressed in terms of the access to the past. Secondly, I 
will show that the same relation also underlies that between the mental-image (or the 
perceived image) and the image-object (the material counter-part) in ‘The Discrete 
Image.’ And lastly, I suggest that the new kind of seeing given by digitisation also 
derives from the same process of technicisation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  Ibid. 160. Emphasis added. 	  
18  Ibid. 148. 
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Before proceeding to outline the arguments that Stiegler proposes in the text, it is 
useful to define the term ‘discrete image.’ Stiegler uses this term inter-changeably with 
the phrase ‘analogico-digital image’ while referring to what is commonly understood as 
the digital photograph. The term ‘analogico-digital image’ indicates the relation to the 
analog predecessor of the digital photograph. This relation highlights the essentially 
“orthothetic” aspect or the “exactitude” of recording that is common to both digital and 
analog photographs.19 For Stiegler, orthothesis is inaugurated for the first time in history 
with alphabetic writing that made the event of speech or language available in its ‘exact’ 
and immediately accessible form.  The analog photograph also allows for such an exact 
recording of light as the silver crystals of a photograph precisely capture it.20 Stiegler 
argues that analog technologies, such as the photograph and the phonograph, can 
“(reconstitute) much vaster levels of the past” (such as gesture, form, sound) than that 
constituted previously by written or printed books.21 The access to the past inscribed and 
thereby constituted by technics is fundamental to Stiegler’s argument. 
Epokhe or suspension that Stiegler discusses in the text is also comparable to 
orthothesis.22 In phenomenological terms, exact recording implies a “suspension” in “the 
relation to time” and “to memory and death.” 23 Stiegler argues that such an orthothetic 
process of exact reconstitution of the past is what the analogico-digital technology 
“continues and amplifies.”24 The digital image does produce a lack of certitude about the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford  UP, 
2009) 13.	  
20 Ibid. 13.	  
21 Bernard Stiegler, “Anamnesis and Hypomnesis,” Lecture transcript, Oslo. 2007.  13 April. 2010 
<http://www.aresearchguide.com/8firstfo.html#19>.	  
22  Stiegler, The Discrete Image 149. 
23  Ibid. 149. 
24 Ibid. 149.	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image as “has-been” but digitisation creates a means of inscription with pixels that can 
yield “libraries” of images, objects or elements of images and of various movements (of 
the visible as well as unseen world). New knowledge and visual intelligence are possible 
because of the new ways of constituting, and hence creating access to more aspects of the 
past.25   
1.  Technics and man 
 
Stiegler’s concept of technics incorporates the Greek concept of techne, which is 
often mentioned in his texts and is sometimes used interchangeably with technics. Techne 
denotes all practices (art) that require skill including crafts and fine arts. Techne also 
referred more generally to any “reflected system of practices, notions and concepts,” in 
ancient Greece.26 The term applied to a range of practices including the art (or techne) of 
living and the art of governance. Stiegler implies from this that “all human action has 
something to do with techne…”27 The inclusion of techne within the concept of technics 
allows Stiegler to generalise technics to incorporate a wide range of practices and human 
endeavours alongside technologies such as digital photography.  
The creation and constitution of man himself, Stiegler suggests, is tied to technics. 
The history of man as such is inseparable from the history of technics.28 Stiegler argues 
that the history of man consists in the “pursuit of the evolution of the living by other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  Ibid. 157.	  
26  Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject Lectures at the College de France 1981-	  
    1982, ed. Frederic Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)  249.  
27  Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009)  94. 
28  Stiegler, The Discrete Image 173.	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means than life,” which is to say means that are external to his biological being.29 This 
pursuit refers to the creation of various forms of technics such as simple hand tools, 
writing, painting, photography and other modern technologies. Stiegler states further that 
technics are an intrinsic part of humans because man is defined by a lack of quality, 
according to the Promethean myth. Instead he is endowed with technics with which he 
can fashion tools and fabricate artifacts.30 Stiegler understands this lack of quality as a 
lack of memory. He calls this “retentional finitude,” following Derrida and Husserl.31 
Stiegler also suggests that human memory, or the access to a ‘past’ (that includes all 
knowledge) is always and originarily exteriorised through technics and consigned to 
traces or marks in the Derridian sense of the word. For the purposes of further discussion 
I shall refer to this particular process of exteriorising memory as technicisation.  
The trace or mark is also what is sometimes called différance in Derrida’s 
philosophy. The term designates “the movement” through which “language or …any 
system of referral” is “instituted.”32 The trace or différance constitutes or produces all 
oppositions and dualities such as the signified and the signifier. The relation to time for 
instance is created by the work of différance – the deferral that is also at once a 
differentiation. The present is defined in relation to the past seen in the photograph from 
which it is differentiated but this past is also experienced only through a deferral to a 
future (which for the spectator is the present). This past seen in the photograph is that 
which “… has been here, and yet immediately separated, irrefutably present, and yet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1 135.	  
30  Bernard Stiegler, “Technics of Decision: An Interview,” Angelaki 8.2  (2003): 156. 	  
31  Stiegler, The Discrete Image 174.	  
32 Jacques Derrida, “Différance,” Margins of Philosophy, trans.  Alan Bass (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 
1984)  12. 
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always deferred.” 33 All differences are produced by such simultaneous spacing and 
deferral. The differences themselves are effects of this movement or play of différance.34 
This movement then is the basis of all concepts.35 The trace, mark or différance – the 
movement that produces differences and conceptuality is writing. Writing here is not 
writing in the notational and literal sense of the word. It denotes the process of inscription 
understood in its most general sense. Derrida states that the meaning of trace (of writing 
in this broad sense) extends beyond the verbal sign and human language itself.36  
Stiegler contends that that which specifies différance itself is the exteriorised 
memory created using technics. This memory, he states, is the provenance or the “central 
concept” of différance.37 The movement that produces all differentiation, he argues, is 
produced in the process of exteriorisation of memory. Stiegler describes this 
exteriorisation as  “the recapitulating, dynamic and morphogenetic...accumulation of 
individual experiences.”38 Technicisation, following these considerations, can be defined 
simply as the process of inscription by which individual experiences and knowledge are 
articulated and hence made available. Inscription here retains the importance of writing in 
the formation of the trace in Derrida’s philosophy. 
Stiegler’s notion of the exteriorisation (of memory) through technics also 
appropriates the concept defined by the Greek term hypomnesis.39 The word signifies 
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“aids to memory.”40 The term refers simply to “a collection of quotations or things in the 
form of notes” or it might designate “any commentary or form of written memory,” kept 
by a person.41 These notes are said to be “for use of oneself” but they were also useful for 
others.42 It has been noted that ancient Greek philosophers shared their hypomenata with 
disciples and others in need of advice.43 These notes were for “future use” (eis husteron) 
and they were created as “equipment” (paraskeue) that could be used in various 
circumstances.44 The creation of these notes allowed subjects to reread what was written 
at different times and in this way the contents of the notes could be “reactualized.”45 This 
concept of hypomnesis includes the relation of memory to writing, the creation of 
knowledge through a technique and the access of this knowledge at a later time, all of 
which are important to Stiegler’s concept of exteriorisation. Stiegler generalises this 
particular practice of note-keeping specific to Greek thought and applies it more 
generally to all forms of technics. He writes for instance that the “Internet is the age of 
the hypomnesis.”46 
By borrowing the enabling dynamism of différance for technics and generalising 
a particular Greek process, Stiegler infers that all concepts, all distinctions and all 
knowledge are given by technicisation. Stiegler also specifies certain stages of the said 
human “evolution” through technics. The earliest forms of technics were flaked 
pebbles.47 These, Stiegler observes, are not explicit memory stores but the “possibility of 
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transmitting knowledge acquired individually, but in a non-biological way” is opened up 
with their appearance.48 Later with alphabetic writing, for the first time, mnemotechnics 
appear and this creates a means of constituting the past (memory) and of transmitting it. 
With analog reproducibility and technologies such as analog photography, phonographs 
and machines that reproduce the gestures, movements of men, “mnemotechnologies” 
appear.49  
With regards to the relation of man and technics, Stiegler applies the concept of 
différance to critique the opposition of the two in metaphysics and philosophy. He argues 
that in the place of this opposition of man and technics one needs to see a co-constitution 
through the movement of différance. But since différance in Stiegler’s thinking is itself 
produced by processes of technical inscription, both man and technics are constituted by 
technicisation. This is summed up in “…the appearance of the human is the appearance 
of the technical…the human invents himself in the technical by inventing the tool- by 
becoming exteriorised techno-logically.”50 Stiegler in this way reconciles the 
metaphysical duality of man and technics by proposing a condition of ontological priority 
where technical processes constitute man and his possibilities. 
In conclusion, Stiegler conceives of technics as an intrinsic part of the human 
constitution in so far as the human has a limited memory. From here, Stiegler goes on to 
argue for the radical possibility that all human skill and knowledge is given by 
technicisation- the process of exteriorising memory. This process is simply any means of 
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inscription that is given by technics, such as writing and photography, through which the 
past is constituted and made accessible as a dynamic store of memory.  
 
2.  Motif of the Specter 
 
The motif of the specter, in Stiegler, outlines how the “past” that is given by 
technicisation defines human conditions and gives human possibilities in advance. This 
reveals how new technics may yield the possibilities outlined in ‘The Discrete Image.’ 
The past given by technics is one that has not been lived but which appears as a 
“spirit,” a ghost (revenant) or specter. Barthes speaks of specters in his discussion of 
analog photography. The specter or the ghost is also an important part of Derrida’s re-
thinking of the notion of ‘presence’ in philosophy. In the place of the self-evidence of 
presence Derrida argues for the importance of revenants- the returning past(s) at the heart 
of the present that cannot be banished. In this sense the spectral logic is the logic of the 
trace or différance.51 The specter also surfaces in the work of Heidegger and his 
philosophy of being. Heidegger, Stiegler notes, brings the question of “heritage” – or an 
unlived past, to philosophy for the very first time.52 The specter in Stiegler’s conception 
draws on the work of all these three thinkers. An important difference however is that 
Stiegler argues that specters are transmitted by technics.  
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Barthes speaks of the ‘referent’ of the analog image as the “spectrum of the 
photograph.”53 The word spectrum “retains” the concept of a spectacle or a kind of vision 
and adds to it the implications of a ghostly return of a (dead) past.54 The ghostly aspect of 
the presentation of the photograph is crucial for it is in this sense that Barthes speaks of 
“emanation” - the analog photograph, he states, is an “emanation of the referent. 55” This 
means that it is constituted through the light that is reflected directly from the contours of 
the person in front of the lens. In Barthes’ combination of spectacle and return, two 
aspects of the returning past converge and give the condition of the spectator’s 
captivation beyond any possibility of “escape.”56  
Derrida too argues that this returning past does not permit any reciprocal response 
from the viewer.57 He uses the term ‘visor effect’ for the gaze of the past that concerns 
the one who is watched and which addresses him.58 Stiegler describes this condition in an 
instance in the text where he describes his seeing of the photograph of Baudelaire and the 
effect of being “touched” by the ghost of the dead poet but of not being able to touch him 
in return.59 ‘Past’ that is seen in a photograph, read in a book or accessed through any 
inscription, creates a situation of incommensurability in both Derrida’s and Barthes’ 
thinking. 
For Stiegler, specters appear through inscription or technics such as writing. The 
‘spectrum’ in Stiegler's revision of the Barthesian concept becomes the “revelation” of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida 9.	  
54 Ibid. 9.	  
55 Ibid. 80.	  
56 Ibid. 90. 
57 Derrida, Spectrographies 120.	  
58 Ibid. 120. 
59 Stiegler, The Discrete Image 152.	  
	   Nathan 23	  
“chemical reaction on photo-sensitive film.”60 The conjunction of the ghostly appearance 
of a past in the present is given in the interfacing of the optical system of image-capture 
and the chemical reaction that reveals the image to the spectator (in his present).61 The 
ghost that Derrida defines as an inheritance or a debt becomes in Stiegler's formulation a 
product of technics in this manner. It follows then that the specters of the past, that 
address the spectator while also surpassing him, are given by technics and made possible 
by the inscriptions of technicisation.62  
The specter however is not only of that which comes before but it is also that 
which is yet to come. Barthes writes about the old photograph of the young Lewis Payne 
taken moments before he is to be hanged. He reads in this picture both- ‘he is dead’ and 
that ‘he is going to die.’63 The photograph not only gives Barthes the pose of the absolute 
past but also speaks of the “death in the future.”64 Stiegler conceives of this as a 
mirroring that produces the relation of the self to itself and its relation to time. The 
spectator, Stiegler argues, sees his own death “coming into view” in the simultaneous 
experience of the past and the future deaths.65 The photograph opens the space between 
“here and there,” “past and future” creating the very basis for temporalisation.66 The 
photograph in its two-sided relation to time also reveals the work of anticipation- the 
relation to future. Stiegler argues that “technologies” that transform our relations to the 
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past, also give us our new relations to the future.67 This condition is explicated stated in 
the opening remark of his book Technics and Time,1: “The object of this work is technics 
apprehended as the horizon of every possible future possibility and every possibility of a 
future.”68 
Derrida too argues that the ghost of the “wholly other,” or that of the past is 
inheritance.69 This inherited past always “exceeds…infinitely and universally” the one 
that comes after.70 It denies him any “absolute autonomy.”71 But at the same time, the 
specter is also that which grants autonomy. It is a “condition of freedom,” as freedom 
stems from “this responsibility” born in “the eyes of the other.”72 This implication is 
crucial for Stiegler too, for it outlines the condition of opening up of new possibilities that 
occurs with spectral returns- that they only arise from the debt or advance created by the 
past.  
We may recall here that for Stiegler through each new form of technics, and with 
the analogico-digital technology in ‘The Discrete Image’ too, the past that is available is 
amplified which greater possibilities of relating to the future. The notion of “reflexivity” 
in ‘The Discrete Image’ encapsulates the possibility both of reflecting on the past and of 
anticipating and reflecting on the future.73 In other words, having access to greater stores 
of the past implies new ways in which the future can be imagined, anticipated and 
prepared for.  
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But Stiegler’s concept of orthothesis or exactitude also has implications for the 
spirits or specters. Exactitude implies a single, unified ghost.74 This is an important 
modification of the logic of the specter. The inherited past is singular, according to 
Stiegler. This does not however mean that a static history or world of references is given 
by the world of objects and tools. The processes of exteriorisation are dynamic of 
themselves. The dynamism of exteriorisation is the productive dynamism animating all 
(human) relation, conception and knowledge. This dynamism has been described earlier 
as the non-constant movement that produces meaning by difference and deferral. This is 
nothing but the movement of différance. 
The concept of the debt or inheritance in Stiegler’s work also extends Heidegger’s 
notion of “historiality.”  Heidegger, according to Stiegler, proposes the material world or 
“the world of useful objects, of tools, utensils, equipment” as constitutive of the “horizon 
of signification.”75 The world of objects becomes then the structure of reference for the 
human.76 Stiegler suggests that the creation of these objects, the organs and tools of the 
material world creates a “new basis of memory,” which allows individual experience to 
pass on from generation to generation. Heidegger describes this memory as Dasein's 
historiality or the historical past that always informs the condition of man’s being.77 
Stiegler however critiques Heidegger for not raising “the question of the actual 
conditions of this inheritance, inasmuch as they are already inscribed in its original 
technicity.”78 He argues that the past of human experiences exists in the artificial supports 
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of objects or what is called the exteriorised memory. The artificial supports of memory 
are inscribed (hence constituted) by the process of technicisation. This memory creates 
the world as a world always “inhabited by spirits” of the past, of a certain history that 
always comes before and that which is inherited by Dasein. Following Derrida this 
inheritance for Stiegler is always an excess that surpasses humans. 
Such specters or advances of the past are given by technicisation: 
Originally objectified and exteriorized, memory which is constantly expanding 
technically and expanding the knowledge of mankind and its power 
simultaneously escapes their grasp and surpasses them… 79  
Stiegler writes in ‘The Discrete Image’ that from the very first instance of techncis- the 
flaked pebble, we are dealing always with the ghostly.80 Technicisation produces the 
‘specters’ of the unlived past in all the meanings suggested above- as a debt, as 
inheritance, as advance on the future, as that beyond human autonomy and as constitutive 
of being. It follows from here that technical processes articulate all possibilities of 
humans ahead of them. For instance, in ‘The Discrete Image,’ Stiegler states that the 
analog image as a trace over-determines our relation to time (which is also to say to 
history).81 
In the above discussion it has been shown that the concept of the specter 
underpins the relation of man and technics in Stiegler’s philosophy. The conditions of 
man and his possibilities are given by specters that are transmitted by technics. In this 
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sense technics becomes the means by which human conditions in general are likely to be 
defined and restricted and also by the same token opened up. This is how technics for 
Stiegler have a unique ontological priority with respect to the human. In general, technics 
create an advance on human possibilities and over-determine human conditions at large. 
This conception of man and technics will prove important for the arguments in ‘The 
Discrete Image.’  
 
3.  Image-object/mental-image and inscription 
  
Just as Stiegler proposes a co-constitution of man and technics, he argues that the 
two aspects of the image- the image-object and the mental-image are also co-constituted. 
The image-object here can be defined as the technical artefact or the material aspect of 
the image. The mental-image is the perceived counter-part of the image-object. In both 
instances, for Stiegler, it is the process of technicisation that constitutes the dualities. 
‘The Discrete Image’ opens with the suggestion of adopting Derrida’s critique of 
the two sides of the sign- the signifier and signified, to the two aspects of the image– the 
“image-object” and the “mental-image.” A mental-image is that which we might say is 
intended by the spectator of an image. Derrida argues that the traditional notion of the 
sign even when it insists on the co-existence of the signified (the ideal meaning) and the 
signifier (written form) determines the written signifier as “technical and representative,” 
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inscribing but not affecting in any way the meaning itself.82 Derrida argues instead that 
the thing itself is nothing but a sign. Nothing is free of being inscribed by means of a 
generalised writing (or arche-writing) described earlier.83 This is to say that both the 
signifier and the signified are inscribed by traces and are produced as effects of the 
movement of différance.   
An important consequence of Derrida’s critique that Stiegler draws attention to is 
that there is no “ideal invariant” or signified of which the signifier would only be a 
“contingent variation.”84 Stiegler implies from this that no ‘mental-images’ exist as such 
but that these appear always as remnants of the ‘image-object’ in so far as the latter is 
that which is inscribed or written.85 This can be seen as similar to Stiegler’s argument 
about man, who does not exist before technics and is constituted through the process of 
technicisation. Importing Derrida’s critique for the purposes of his discussion, Stiegler 
concludes that the “question of the image is…that of the trace and of inscription.”86 The 
trace and inscription Stiegler mentions here belong to the general process of 
technicisation. 
It is crucial to recall that ‘The Discrete Image’ is concerned with the changes in 
the ‘mental-image’ and its transformation with the coming of digitisation. Stiegler's 
argument is that a new relation to the image is possible and that this would be based on a 
new visual intelligence. Intelligence here is specifically related to what he calls “techno-
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intuitive knowledges” or “intentions.” In other words, the intelligence here is an 
intelligent way of apprehending or intending images. The discussion to follow will 
elaborate on Stiegler’s concept of “intention” and will establish that intention too is given 
or constituted by the same process of technicisation.  
 
4.   Intention and the technical production of the analog image 
 
The belief that what is seen in an analog image ‘has-been’ is defined by Barthes 
as the ‘noeme’ or the very essence of the photograph. Stiegler interprets Barthes’ noeme 
in relation to the phenomenological notion of “intentionality.”87 He suggests that the 
spectator “intentionally” synthesises the analog image and this synthesis is also that of 
the “belief” in the “this was.”88 That which is intended by the spectator when he looks at 
an analog image is the “synthesis as belief” that what is seen “has-been.” Stiegler further 
specifies that this intentional synthesis of belief is tied to technological conditions of 
producing or inscribing the image.  
Stiegler recalls an observation that Barthes makes regarding the photographic 
that-has-been. He states that the belief that what is seen “has-been” was possible only 
“when a scientific circumstance (the discovery that silver halogens were sensitive to 
light) made it possible to recover and print directly…” 89 “Techno-logic exactitude,” 
Stiegler argues, in this way produces the adherence of the referent to the photograph.  
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The technique of writing also implies a similar exactitude in its relation to thought and 
language: 
If I read a dialogue by Plato…I include in my intention as a reader that it is really 
Plato who speaks. I deal with the thought experience of Plato himself…90  
The fact that in reading Plato’s dialogue or looking at Baudelaire’s image, one identifies 
the relation to Plato and to Baudelaire respectively is the ‘intention’ at work. In any 
human intention such as these, the exactitude of the recording technique of either 
alphabetic writing or of analog photography is always “pre-supposed.”91	   
Stiegler indicates too that the spectator intends based on the knowledge he has of 
the “technical conditions of the image-object’s production.”92 He writes that the: 
...spectator is affected, in the very way in which he synthesizes, by the 
photographic image as receptacle of the sliver effect without which the 
photographic noeme would not take.93 
The “silver effect” or the technique of silver halogens trapping and printing reflected 
light holds within it the very possibility of the intention of the spectator and his synthesis 
of belief. Stiegler writes explicitly that synthesis (of belief and intention) occurs based on 
what the spectator knows or thinks he knows of the technology that produced the 
image.94 This knowledge is what Stiegler defines as “techno-intuitive knowledges.”95 In 
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other words, the spectator's relation to the image is marked in advance by the technical 
possibilities of the inscription of the image.  
The premise that intention is based on the knowledge of the process of technical 
inscription is important for the possibilities of new intentions with digital images. It will 
be argued in the last section that these possibilities are also articulated and given by 
technicisation.    
 
5.   Discretisation or digitisation 
 
Discretisation is defined by Stiegler as the general technical process of breaking 
down flows or continuities into separate units as in the case of writing breaking down the 
flow of speech.96 In ‘The Discrete Image’ digitisation is understood as the breaking of the 
flow of light. With the process of discretisation or digitisation, an image is split into tiny 
units of colour (red, blue and green components of each hue) and spatial organisation 
(two-dimensional surface). Digitisation also affects a differentiation or discretisation of 
the process of image making. For instance, the light sensors in cameras capture image 
information. The information itself is stored and processed elsewhere in the camera. The 
conversion of the image into a numerical matrix composed of binary data implies also the 
independent reproducibility of the image elsewhere. None of these operations were 
separated in the earlier analog image where the film retained its role as the common basis 
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for capturing information, storing it and reproducing the image. And since the grains did 
not permit electro-magnetic transfer which bits allow, the reproducibility of the image 
was also limited. 
Stiegler refers to these aspects where he states that the new analogico-digital 
image allows for “differentiated access” (to pixels) and the separation of discrete 
elements can occur “in a non-photographic manner (by using computational methods).”97 
The increased reproducibility of the digital image also has implications for the access to 
“specters” described earlier. Stiegler quotes Derrida’s comment in a film where the latter 
states that modern technology “increases tenfold the power of ghosts.”98 The change that 
the digital image is said to engender is tied to this increase in the presence and strength of 
specters which implies that new possibilities are also being opened up.  
Stiegler also argues that this process of discretisation is one that is already at work 
in the analog image but only to a lesser degree. Not only is the analog image made of 
grains that are comparable to pixels, the analog image is also affected by framing choices 
and contexts which render a particular past to be seen as ‘has been.’99 In light of this, it 
can be inferred that Stiegler refers to discretisation in the broadest sense as a general 
inscription of images in the absence of a simple straightforward relation to reality- both 
for analog and the analogico-digital image. Inscription here indicates the concept of 
différance that is based on a generalised writing and importantly is, as suggested earlier, a 
means of technicisation for Stiegler.  
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Also, following the earlier discussions, technicisation is the process of 
exteriorisation in which human knowledge (and memory) is inscribed through technics 
like writing. And the history of technics consists in the continuous expansion of this 
exteriorisation. With digital technology, the expansion already implied in the recording of 
light and sound of earlier analog technologies are seen as further broadened with the 
description of various components of light and the differentiated access to discrete 
elements of images. The amplification of past inscribed and hence made available by 
digital images implies new possibilities of studying or analysing this past and also 
knowledge that could be produced by such analysis.  
When images are broken into tiny units of space and colour different objects, 
planes and other “discrete regularities” of formal variation can be defined as 
compositions made of these units. The identification of such units then becomes 
possible.100 The study of images in relation to its visual elements and formal components 
is akin to the study of language for its structure and the elements of language- words and 
sentences. The comparison is pertinent for grammar takes language as its object and 
describes its rules. And as a meta-linguistic practice the digitisation process too implies a 
similar study of images, the visible world and movement.101 
The analysis of images in this form is what occurs when algorithms detect “forms, 
syntax and elements of content” in images.102 The occurrences of elements are then 
tagged and indexed allowing for further analysis. The existence of indexes, for instance, 
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implies various forms of “non-linear” movement through films in accordance with the 
indexes that code regularities in the sequence of images.103 Indexes become means of 
studying the occurrence of elements and also studying their frequencies within 
collections of images and in this way making possible knowledge about the structures 
and grammars of images more generally. Stiegler describes this as the 
“grammaticalization of the visible.”104  
Stiegler states too that “libraries of objects and of movements, expressions, 
sounds…” produced through indexing tools can be deployed in new compositions of 
images.105 The libraries inscribe and transmit specters. New image-objects can be made 
using the elements of images identified and organised in such libraries and summary 
indexes. We may note here that Stiegler points to the fact that there are always more than 
one possible language states and a grammar is chosen by a grammarian from amongst 
these possibilities that are always already more than one.106 This implies that language is 
open to new synthesis as grammatical rules generate new knowledge by restricting the 
framework of usage but also by the same token providing the directions for inventive 
usage and application through the confines of rule following.  
Stiegler also argues that the algorithms of digital analysis prescribe and limit the 
kinds of objects that can be identified and hence they limit the combinatorial capacities of 
visual constructions or re-constructions. The description of new movements at the level 
of coding (in algorithms), or rather the computational description of the forms and 
patterns is the inscription of the possibilities of discrete manipulation of the elements of 
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images. This is why the “grammaticalization” of images will only occur in relation to the 
algorithms of form recognition, which in turn are developed in relation to “industrial 
strategies and battles for norms.”107 The standardisation of the forms of description in 
algorithms and various formats of images will play a crucial role in limiting the kinds of 
discrete regularities that can be described, identified and studied. By extension, for 
Stiegler, such standards will dictate the limits of intentions and intuitive-knowledges 
about images too.  
Since specters that indebt those that come after also give their autonomy, the 
articulation of grammars opens new avenues including that of knowledge. Writing and 
the invention of grammar that came with it, Stiegler notes, gave rise to “logic, 
philosophy, science, etc…” 108 Similar epistemological gains are already occurring with 
digitisation that can be seen in the various “simulations being used in physics, chemistry 
and astrophysics...virtual worlds, clones of real beings, artificial intelligence, form 
recognition…” 109 These are the new knowledges that are made possible by digital 
images.110  
As discussed earlier, intention for Stiegler is always related to the knowledge the 
spectator has of the process of technical inscription of the image. With the new 
knowledges produced by digital analytics Stiegler argues that new intentions would 
occur. Also, the analytical possibilities present at the level of the algorithms of software 
and inscribed through discretisation, will lead to “analytic apprehension” of images by 
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spectators.111 Instead of seeing images as remnants of the past, the new technologies that 
allow for the breaking down of images into their formal components give spectators the 
possibility of similarly perceiving images analytically and in terms of their various visual 
components (objects, planes for instance).  
 
In conclusion then, Stiegler’s argument can be summed up as follows. Consumers 
will become capable of a more intelligent and critical perception as a result of 
digitisation. This possibility is necessarily implied by digitisation itself with which 
various elements of images can be isolated and studied. Furthermore, the new form of 
seeing will be limited to the kinds of analysis that are technologically (computationally) 
possible.  
The constitution and over-determination of new possibilities (of seeing in this 
instance) by the process of technicisation, I have argued, is integral to Stiegler’s thought. 
This process describes the relation of man and technics for Stiegler. Human possibilities, 
conditions, knowledge and futures are given in advance by specters (of the past) that are 
both constituted and accessed through technicisation. The specter of technicisation haunts 
all that is and all that is to come in Stiegler’s world-view.  
But the ontological priority that Stiegler accords technics or more specifically 
technical inscriptions is also at once an ontological reduction. This is to say man, mental-
images, and intentions have no existence of their own and are entirely derived from their 
technical (or technological) counter-parts. We may recall that for Stiegler the mental-
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image exists only as a remnant of an image-object. In the next chapter I consider this 
philosophical position in some depth by looking at contemporary conditions wherein 
such an ontological reduction holds in relation to the real world. But the same conditions 
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Chapter 2: Technicisation in context: Brain Science and Consumer reality 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
[Music plays and slowly fades out as the narrator speaks] 
America is in danger -a peril greater than any of the horrendous radioactive qualities of 
the hydrogen bomb tests. Every man woman and child from the crisp cool shores of 
Montauk Point to the great Oregon forests lives in the heinous shadows of the HFN. The 
HFN is the monster and what is the HFN? 
[Loud clang] 
Hi-Fi nuts. 
[Voice changes to one with an even narrative tone] 
Years ago, there was only one unit usually made of wood with a nickel-plated unit you 
could wind. 
[An old song plays] 
Hey Charlie …ain’t that record a riot? 
Yea, it’s alright.  That loudspeaker sounds tinny. 
[Sound of cymbals] 
This is a seemingly innocent remark but agents from the FBI - Federal Bureau of 
Impedance112 high and low- were watching men like Charlie. The FBI were realising that 
some sellers could get a guy like Charlie hooked pretty easy.  
[Sound of a door knock followed by the door opening] 
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Yes? 
Did the stuff come? 
Yea. Come in. [Pause] Did you ever see a preamplifier like this? It’s got a magnetic 
phono tape-head, distortion 2%, harmonics immeasurable? 
Stop it stop it you fiend. I am going out of my mind. You know I can’t afford it  
How about this new falbac speaker? 
You fiend you know I am still paying for the boosters and the stereo. You dirty rat, you 
got me started on this stuff. 
Take it easy Charlie. You came to me, don’t forget. If you can’t handle it. Charlie, 
Charlie stay away from those knobs. Charlie, don’t touch that big knob. 
[Shrill sound followed by techno sounds. Short silence. Piano tune plays] 
Luckily, Charlie was picked up by the SWOUG and received treatment. The SWOUG - 
stay with one unit group, along with Dr. Stereocape, an ex-audiophile, took a special 
interest in Charlie. Charlie was helped to kick. Charlie almost had the variable reluctance 
cartridge off his back. 
Hey doc, I had one of these pills you gave me. I just feel a little strange.  
Oh those tranquilisers? 
Tranquillisers? Oh.. I thought you said transistors? 
[Sound effect] 
I have a very perplexing hum coming from my Daca 3000W power amplifier. It seems to 
be coming from the amplifier chasseee instead of the speaker [Voice starts to sound 
garbled] I can rear adjust the…….unplugging the rectifier tube does not reduce the 
intensity of the huMM…resist…he is trying to kiss my sister…dishhplay…. [Voice 
becomes incomprehensible and fades into techno sounds] 
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[Several different people start talking some of whom echo others] 
Look his mouth is getting bigger 
His mouth is getting bigger and bigger  
Look his arms are shrinking  
Boy his mouth is really wide now  
What should we do? What should we do? 
We can’t really see him…Why his eyes have disappeared  
So have his legs…Why there is nothing left but his mouth  
[Pause] 
What should we do? 
I have got an idea. Lets get some lumber. 
Do you think we should? 
He would have wanted it that way. Just get some lumber.  
[Sound of axe on wood] 
Make a box around his mouth. Put that webbing. Ok. Put this wire in here. [Sound of 
wire stretching] Next to the second molar there. Not around the other one. Ok. Switch his 
ear on. [Sound of knob being turned] 
[The old Song from before plays again but the sound is audibly flattened]   
-Lenny Bruce, “The March of High Fidelity,” 1958.113 
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According to Stiegler, modern digital technology will increase the strength and 
presence of specters as vaster levels of the past will be constituted or inscribed by 
technological processes. For instance, digital copies of all Greek texts would be indexed 
and made accessible. New possibilities for futures would be opened through such 
relations to the past. This is the basis for Stiegler’s argument that humans will develop a 
new intelligent and critical gaze and be able to synthesise new images as well. This 
possibility is theoretically admissible given the nature of digital technology itself.  
Now consider the apriori conditions that would have to be fulfilled for the said 
possibilities to be realised. In the first instance, the development of the critical aspect of 
perception implies the existence of certain capacities in so far as analytic mental 
processes are relevant here. These would be mental capacities analogous to those that 
presumably existed prior to the arrival of the Greek alphabet and which allowed for the 
flourishing of knowledges of various kinds.114 But in the digital age human cognitive and 
perceptual capacities are being targeted and honed in media saturated landscapes. The 
conditions of human existence are establishing in advance the images or things that 
consumers will attend and respond to and in this way cementing lasting (pre) dispositions 
of the eyes and the mind. Charlie’s mishearing of “tranquillisers” is not an accident. 
Secondly, humans, like other creatures, are likely to adapt in relation to conditions 
of need or survival and in response to technologies (environments) that they exist with 
and within. This is how new synthesis occurs. Artists, for instance, have traditionally 
operated in relation to the technics of their times and their particular needs. Such 
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adaptation is also evident in processes of perception. Vision adapts to its available 
network of (learnt) representations such that subsequent learning, though driven by need 
(sight of food for instance), is always delimited by this already established network.115 
This network by the same token is also that which enables further, finer delineations - 
creation of new indexes. In much the same way, humans today are likely to learn to adapt 
to perceptual triggers such as brand images and evolve along directions of perceived 
needs that are also constructed by the same mediated realities. The comical description of 
Charlie’s transformation in the above manuscript alludes to such mutations.  
In response to a recently published study revealing “extreme” physical changes in 
brain structure caused by Internet addiction, neuroscientist Karl Friston remarked that the 
findings were no surprise if one thought of the brain as a muscle that is being toned and 
re-shaped, perhaps, to fit the needs of a good online gamer.116 The changes, it has been 
suggested, may well impair cognitive decision-making capacities including “those to 
trump the desire to stay online and return to the real world.117” Long term affects of these 
physical changes are not known.  
In this chapter I have chosen a few scenarios to illustrate some such developments 
peculiar to the previous century, specifically the last few decades that endanger the 
possibilities of digital technology that Stiegler alludes to. 
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1. Brains producing minds/Technics constituting man 
 
In the opening note of the special issue of Daedelus commemorating the ‘decade 
of the brain’ that was published in 1998, neuroscientist, Vernon B. Mountcastle writes: 
…the half-century's accumulation of knowledge of brain function has brought us 
face to face with the question of what it means to be human. We make no 
pretension that solutions are at hand, but assert that what makes man human is his 
brain. 118 
This assertion is the philosophical premise that supports the scientific enterprise of 
contemporary neuroscience - that “processes of the mind” are reducible to “processes of 
the brain.119” As Mountcastle states it, neuroscience has set itself the task of “closing” 
“the explanatory gap” by telling us how this happens.120  
But a different philosophy of mind was prevalent not so long ago. This was the 
doctrine of Cartesian dualism.121 Cartesians insisted that humans were not mere complex 
versions of machines.122 They held the external world as knowable and definable by the 
laws of mechanics and the world of the mind as precisely unknowable. Philosopher 
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Gilbert Ryle, in his famous critique of this dualism published in 1949, calls this the 
“dogma of the Ghost in the Machine.”123 
Three decades after Ryle, psychologist Donald Hebb states, “Mind is the central 
psychological problem, although it is no longer fashionable to say so…unless one is a 
dualist one must agree that it is the brain that thinks…”124 In place of the previous 
dualism Hebb outlines a position that had by then become popular and also “scientifically 
productive.125” This was the “monism” that the “mental processes are brain processes.”126  
Instead of holding that the mind and the brain are essentially distinct, monism takes the 
two to be related such that the brain produces the mind. Monism entails the ontological 
reduction wherein “mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world. 127” 
This means mental states, beliefs, and other entities like mental images are taken to be 
entirely reducible to or derived from physical phenomenon. Stiegler’s philosophy shares 
this ontological premise with current neuroscience. Both take mental entities and by 
extension human possibilities to be ontologically reducible to certain non-human or 
physical phenomenon.  
Monism nevertheless remains faithful to the “official doctrine” of the Cartesians. 
Ryle points out that while the Cartesians insisted that the mind was unavailable for 
comment they still resorted to the “grammar of mechanics” to (negatively) define it.128 
The mind was not clock-like; it was not mechanical. Monists today hold that chemicals, 
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neurons or their activities produce mental processes as entities or phenomenon or as 
emergent properties. While the Cartesians claimed that the mind was unknowable in 
mechanical terms, the monists claim that the mind must be explainable in terms of the 
known or knowable activities of the brain.129 Monism then is persisting in the tradition of 
“false categories.”130   
In 2002, prominent neuroscientist Antonio Damasio writes that a “substantial 
explanation” for the “mind's emergence from the brain will be produced and perhaps 
soon.”131 Some even insist that the explanatory gap has already been closed.132 While 
others claim that such claims are persisting on “mere belief.”133 In the words of 
psychologist William Uttal, “…we really do not yet have the barest glimmerings of how 
the brain produces the mind. ”134  
Noam Chomsky compares the enterprise of neuroscience of reducing the mind to 
the workings of the brain to another reduction - that of chemistry to physics. Although 
talk of the reduction of chemistry had been around for centuries, it only took place in the 
1930’s after a radical revision of physics had occurred.135 A new conception of matter 
was able to explain the world of atoms, affinities and bonds in chemistry. But by then “a 
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rich body of doctrine” of chemistry had been established.136 The same cannot be said 
about the brain sciences that are barely more than a few decades old. And simpler 
problems pertaining to the higher mental faculties are still “poorly understood” or “not at 
all.”137 Besides one could very well investigate the mind and the brain in separate fields 
just as chemistry and physics were practiced for centuries as separate disciplines before a 
reduction became possible.  
The prevalent form of monism then is not only committed to the problematic 
conception that the entire mental sphere can be reduced to the brain and its activities but 
also an apparently unwarranted assumption that this “belief” will soon be vindicated. 
Stiegler’s position is distinctive because it puts forward the said ontological reduction not 
as a belief or an assertion, as Mountcastle and others do, but as an evident premise. 
Stiegler insists that the world of the mind including mental-images, intentions, beliefs are 
given by technical processes. His argument for the radical possibilities of digital 
technology rests on this premise that allows him to claim that changes in physical 
(technical) processes necessarily entail changes in the mental realm. On the other hand, 
this form of monism has a scientific and technological legacy that is noteworthy.   
In the early 20th century, the proclaimed father of behaviourism in psychology, 
B.F. Skinner advocated for a “technology of behavior” that would work with the same 
“power and precision” seen in other technologies.138 He argued that an instrumental 
scientific approach had to be taken towards studying behaviour. In doing so, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136   Noam Chomsky,  New horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000) 
166.	  
137 Ibid. 	  
138 B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, 10th ed. (New York: Bantam/Vintage, 1972) 5. 
	   Nathan 47	  
behaviourism abolished such things as intentions and will from consideration, deeming 
them “demons” or “indwelling agents.”139 These were regarded as unscientific.  
The cognitive revolution following the Second World War sought to re-consider 
the mental world. Psychologist Jerome Bruner however notes that “meaning” in the 
context of the new cognitive science was termed “information” and the acts of 
constructing meaning were conceived as “information processing.”140 Through such 
transpositions the concept of the “mind” came to be articulated in purely computational 
terms. As Bruner puts it, “there could be no place for ‘mind’ in such a system.141” 
Computability also became a “necessary criterion” for a good theory of cognition. 
Intentions, agency or human beliefs - mental states in general, are not “computable” and 
hence had no causal role to play in the mental realm as understood by cognitive 
scientists.142  
Behaviourism in psychology was also close in line with the growing interest in 
control technologies following the industrial revolution of the late 19th century. Control 
technologies were those that improved predictability of operations. The behaviourists 
created various models and experimental set-ups for the purposes of predicting and 
controlling human behaviour. Both mental and biological processes were boxed off as 
“unknown and …unimportant” in their simple stimulus-response investigations and 
outward events and stimulus from the environment were related directly to the responses 
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(actions) of the individual.143 Since behaviourist models denied the role of biological 
factors, such as heredity or genetic endowment, in human learning, behaviourism proved 
a useful forerunner for the later enterprise of transferring knowledge to machines and for 
creating machines that could learn. This enterprise would later spawn the fields of 
cybernetics and artificial intelligence.  
The advent of the new cognitive science after the war owed much to the next 
wave of control technologies - computer based systems. Psychologist George Miller 
argues that the year 1956 was when “many were riding the waves (that began in)...the 
War…those of servo theory, information theory, signal-detection theory, computer theory 
and computers themselves.”144 A large part of neuroscience today continues this legacy 
by using computational models and simulations for their core research and formulating 
“computational theories” (also called top-down models) for perception and other mental 
aspects. This relationship goes both ways as Nobel Laureate and scientist Eric Kandel 
states, “The designs of computers have been and will continue to be influenced by 
neurobiology.”145 The future as narrated by a scientist reflects the relation forged between 
brain sciences and technology: “... technology can be designed to complement the human 
brain so that mind and technology walk hand-in-hand... into the sunset together!”146  
Notice that conceiving the mental world in terms borrowed from technology is a 
fairly recent historical development of the last hundred years. And that it parallels the 
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increasing importance of technology for scientific research not only in providing tools but 
also in the methodological and conceptual structures used (or inscribed) for research 
itself. We could also look at the new monism and the practices of contemporary 
neuroscience for implications that are relevant to the status of mental-images and 
perception.  
The ontological reduction of monism implies firstly that mental-images have no 
causal role in physical phenomenon and thought. This position is contrary to a long 
tradition of thinking that goes back to Greek philosophy.147 Descartes and the Cartesian 
dualists were the first to claim that thought could happen without mental-images. 
Neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux writes that such disavowal of mental-images 
continues in recent times.148 Not surprisingly, prevalent scientific theories of perception 
take it to be a top-down process with the brain in the driver's seat.149 It should be noted 
here too that other models of perception have existed such as the influential ecological or 
gestalt theory of perception proposed by psychologist James Gibson. But “mainstream 
cognitive scientists” today have their tools “primarily directed at understanding processes 
inside the head.”150  
Stiegler’s conception of perception is perhaps more problematic than the above. 
This is because for Stiegler the mental-image is always already an image-object.151 This 
means the mental-image is conceived in terms that are strictly physical in so far as the 
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image-object is a physical entity. Karl Popper and John Eccles called this kind of 
reductionism “radical materialism.”152 They write that earlier philosophies including that 
of Cartesian dualists, Hobbes and Marx do not deny the existence of the mental world but 
radical materialism (or behaviourism) insists that there is no mental world as such.153 
Radical materialism, Popper and Eccles argue, gives a simple solution to the mind-body 
problem by eliminating the mind altogether. Such thinking is consistent with itself but it 
omits rather than addresses the mind-body problem.154 
With regards to digital technology, it can also be seen that the existence of the 
technology itself is not sufficient for the realisation of new perceptual possibilities that 
Stiegler envisions. The importance of computers and computational syntax in the new 
sciences has contributed significantly to a condition of subjecting images to the 
“intellectual imperialism” of linguistic interpretation, writes art historian and critic 
Barbara Stafford.155 Nobel laureate, neuroscientist Gerald Edelman condemns 
interpretive practices in psychology that reduce visual and other mental representations to 
symbols that can be interpreted in an abstract but well-defined way.156 The scientist, 
Vitorri Gallesse notes that interpretive use of images in research exploits “folk 
psychology” and the belief that humans can read other minds.157 He cautions against a 
“blind reliance upon the heuristic power” of such imaging approaches, “especially” 
because these are used as empirical evidences of “preconceived notions of what the mind 
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is” and “how it works.”158 New knowledges are not a given even with the most 
sophisticated visualisation technologies.  
The new image tools also seem to entrench the duality of the mind and the body. 
They permit the “fragmenting and distancing deconstructions of the body” by the 
“fetishization of isolated parts” of the human anatomy.159 Gallese criticises this 
reductionism in neurophysiology that adopts the behviourist black-box approach to box 
off the relations of the body and the mind and chooses to focus on the responses of the 
body to the processes of the brain alone.160A related problem with this approach is that 
little if any attention is paid to “where from” and “what” data is collected, writes 
Gallese.161 This situation leads us to question if the possibility of visual intelligence in the 
wider consumer world, that Stiegler proposes, is at all likely. 
 
2.  Technologies constitute human realities/ Precluding new knowledge 
 
Anthropologist Anne Allison writes about the enchanting world of Japanese toys - 
Pokemon and a host of others - that have captured the global imagination. The 
development of these toys, she says, stems from an aesthetic of imparting objects with 
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spirits that animate them. The worlds of Japanese toys like that of tamagotchi (the famous 
digital pet from an electronic game) are imaginary worlds where beings manifest in many 
different forms and also transform into other beings. They manifest across various 
platforms like “electronic games, cartoons, cards, movies, comic books and tie-in 
merchandise”162 and take on the guise of innumerable collectibles.  
Allison coins the phrase “techno-animism” for this curious phenomenon - the 
practice of animating material objects of consumer capitalism with spirits.163 Allison 
writes: 
Owners repeatedly comment on how their tamagotchi feel “real” and how they 
interact with these pixilated images as if they were “actual pets”…a bond is 
formed by taking care of the organism: chores and duties in the game 
sequence...[are] meant to mimic those involved in raising a flesh-and-blood-
pet...164 
Animated techno-objects become the “conduit for various forms of communication, 
intimate relationships and arousals.”165 People have become “fluent” in the language 
given by techno-animism and are more “intimate with it” than any other form of 
communication. The spirits imparted to consumer goods are comparable to specters in 
Stiegler’s philosophy that give or constitute human thought and existence in advance.  
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But this peculiarity is not confined to the domain of Japanese toys. In a world 
where all gadgets “aspire to that ipod look,” another anthropologist Thomas Zengotita 
writes that “the feel of the virtual” is leaking “into the physical world.”166 He calls this 
world the “mediated world” where everything seems like something it is supposedly 
referencing. The mediated things are built for consumption and they exist as “options.”167 
The many options, like the versions of Japanese toys, are mere effects that the consumer 
moves through in getting to the next one. Baudrillard echoes that the “real world” is 
“abolished.”168 Things in the world now are nothing more “than an ephemeral sign.”169  
Zengotita calls the inhabitant of this world the “mediated person.” His world is a 
world already made sense of and one inscribed in advance with referenced objects- the 
world of options. Mediated man receives messages that are “aimed” at him.170 These 
messages come through the various screens around him. Viewers are receiving mental 
“massages” as they drift through tailor-made “psychic saunas” in their real and virtual 
wanderings.171 The mediated man receives all his mental possibilities including his 
thoughts and desires through these massages. 
Allison's techno-animism, Zengotita's mediated world and Baudrillard's 
observations speak of a realised monism wherein material things and signs (options) 
indeed give the world of the mind. In a very immediate sense, technics can be seen over-
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determining and providing in advance the various means by which humans (consumers) 
live, experience and make sense of their world. But the techno-determined consumer 
reality has resulted in pathologies and estrangements that obscure and threaten Stiegler's 
optimistic vision of the future of digital technology.  
Allison observes that a new set of mental ailments have been spawned in the 
world given by techno-animated toys. Increasing number of cases of patients who had 
problems with co-workers or family members is being reported. This patient is “a person 
who talks about things. 172” She is “inept at communicating with others” but can talk 
“volubly and assuredly about…[her] material possessions.”173 She manages her life with 
“scrupulous cataloging” and by pigeon holing things to fit into categories, writes 
Allison.174 Trouble arose when the patient was confronted with someone who was not 
literate in the new referential language of things. Zengotita argues that the “mediated 
person” is the global trend.175 We can then conceive of a future universe where this 
literacy would be the norm and objects (virtual or real) would give all categories of 
thought and human relations as they do now for the psychiatric cases in Japan. 
Discussing another pathology of social “shut in” cases that numbered over a 
million in Japan, Allison writes that this is a common enough situation among humans 
and their technology given isolations. “Shut-ins,” or hikikomori as they are called, 
“literally do not leave their rooms.”176 They are unable to form intimacies with others and 
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with themselves. They often characterise their own existence as a “non-existence.”177 
This is another aspect of the “lack” that Stiegler repeatedly stresses in the relation of man 
and technics. Here the negative description of human lives as fundamentally defined by a 
lack becomes a symptom of a pathology leading to incapacities of defining oneself and of 
relating to others. 
But the normal Japanese train commuters seem no less “shut in” to Allison. She 
travels “encapsulated in a bubble of brand-name goods and personal electronics.”178 
Allison recalls James Fuji's term ‘intimate alienation’ for train travel. With intimacies 
given by mediated techno-objects the phrase seems poignant and ever more appropriate. 
Normal life itself is a case of “atomism and disconnection” from support systems like 
family.179 As Allison describes it:  
A portable device like the Walkman not only plays music events that are ‘unique, 
mobile and singular’... but also allows its user to experience a ‘singularity’ that 
interlaces with other singularities to form what there is of the ‘self.’180  
And “more of everyday life” is now “mediated by constructed realities that are 
increasingly engaged as a solitary activity.”181 Psychological and medical studies on 
Internet use indicate occurrences of “detached or disturbed social relationships...[with] 
the computer as the focal point for all contact with the world.”182  
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John Berger argues that the isolation of the human being is a global phenomenon. 
He states that the prison is the figurative image that defines the times we live in.183 The 
prison “is now as large as the planet and its allotted zones vary and can be termed as 
worksite, refugee camp, shopping mall, periphery, ghetto, office block, favela, 
suburb...”184 In these incarcerated conditions everywhere, we can imagine humans 
experiencing and forming singularities and selfs with Walkmans or the Internet. This too 
is a means by which the mental world and its possibilities are given in advance in the 
mediated world. 
The reduction of the human mental world (to mediated options) and the general 
estrangement of humans can be compared to the estrangement of the worker in recent 
industrial and technological history. Writing about the early attempts to mechanise 
production processes, Sigfried Giedion states that isolating human hand movements and 
making them describable was the first step to creating machines.185 Human operators 
were now only required to control the machines that would carry out the primary tasks of 
production. In mid-20th century, numerical control of the production process was 
introduced that could “reduce” the management’s dependence on a “skilled” and 
“relatively autonomous workforce.”186 Infamously, one of the companies used a retarded 
person with the intelligence of a 12-year old to demonstrate the level of actual skill that 
was needed to run the new automated machines.187 The work of those who programmed 
and maintained these machines was also automated in the 1980’s. The charge of 
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scheduling tasks and managing production workflows was handed over to computers and 
the new CAD/CAM systems.188 In recent years, business managers have been supplied 
with automation tools called ‘Business Intelligence Systems’ (BI) - intelligent systems 
that eliminate the need for humans over-seeing business operations.189 This historical 
trajectory outlines the increasing exclusion of human involvement from processes of 
production. Such exclusion amounts to the foreclosure of avenues of human learning. The 
possibilities of learning, it appears, are now the province of technology itself. 
Automation in general can be said to preclude human knowledge. In the design of 
numerical control, machinists were literally “locked out” from production processes and 
all their tasks were “programmed by machines.”190 This situation is evident in today’s 
financial industries too. Scientist and critic Jaron Lanier suggests that in financial 
operations like computer-assisted hedge funds the investors need only “tend the (search) 
engine in the computing cloud, and it searches for money.”191 No understanding exists 
about what the investment can accomplish as too many “layers of abstraction” separate 
the investor from the “events.”192 Berger’s description generalises this phenomenon: 
Today the purpose of most prison walls (concrete, electronic, patrolled or 
interrogatory) is not to keep prisoners in and correct them, but to keep prisoners 
out and exclude them.193  
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Such a systematic exclusion of humans (and human possibilities) could not accommodate 
Stiegler’s vision of a future where consumers gain new critical and analytical capacities 
and become capable of new intentions.   
            The exclusion of humans exists at more mundane levels too. The mediated 
person, Zengotita observes, lives life by choosing from different roles like a method 
actor. His experiences are “self-conscious performances” but only in so far as he is 
choosing between options. The mediated human browsing the web, for instance, need 
only pick from the various information sources that come pre-ordered and prioritised 
according to relevance. Even options become simplified with rating systems. Such media 
preclude any need for “thinking” for the most part. These are, what Barbara Stafford 
calls, “zombie media” – the more or less automatic media for filtering data.194 The 
mediated options and the filters of zombie media can also be understood as “indexes” in 
Stiegler’s sense of the term.  
           Such indexes not only reduce the need for thought but also of bodily 
movement. Virilio writes that the theme park that replaced lost “bodily sensations” of 
physical activity is itself on the verge of “becoming a stage of pure optical illusions.”195 
The 21st century will be marked by the advent of “audiovisual devices” – screens. “Purely 
imaginary mental sensations” simulated by these devices will “mark the definitive 
triumph of sedentariness.”196 This is a picture of the “isolated mind in the disposable 
body” common to both consumer society and contemporary conceptions of neuroscience.    
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The circumstances of the mediated world are also characterised by the same 
disavowal of human will, intention and mental phenomenon seen in contemporary 
cognitive and brain science. Lanier bemoans what he sees as the diminishing importance 
of both creative individuality and expert knowledge. Instead, he states, there is only an 
“obeisance to the ‘hive’ mind” – the “idea that the collective is closer to the truth.”197 The 
cult of mob media is sustained on the faith in ‘information.’ This is the faith that the web, 
the filtering devices (zombie media) and the autonomous life-like world of information 
understands humans “better than they are capable of understanding themselves.”198  
            A cocoon of systems (that create “indexes”) eases the existence of the 
mediated man by predicting his needs and thoughts. These are means for “intention 
detection” – an important phrase in human-computer integration and robotics.199 Systems 
with intention detection in the consumer world are designed to track the actions of the 
individual, learn his behaviour and provide him with ‘suggestions’ of books and other 
things to buy or look at. BBC Technology reporter Bill Thompson writes that consumers 
are only interested in reading relevant articles; they are not looking to read articles by 
specific writers.200 He argues that all newspapers should make their content available 
through software applications that allow automatic download of content based on the 
consumer’s choice of selected filters (indexes). Media theorist Kittler describes a strategy 
for air raids proposed by the US Air Force. On certain days that the locals regarded as 
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propitious recorded voices would be played and special film projectors used to project 
suitable images on clouds. This was a way to “keep the tribes in their villages.”201 The 
filtering and intention-detecting systems are means of precluding conscious attention. 
They are means of incapacitation. The soothing massages – world of options, indexes and 
various animisms, are rendering the mediated man more predictable and pliable while he 
wanders inattentively, aided by his zombie media.  
One final note should to be made on the conditions described here. The story of 
the mediated man pertains to the privileged members of developed nations. These are 
Stiegler’s addressees in ‘The Discrete Image’ and the consumers he refers to in the text 
itself. But the accounts would not apply, as Zengotita notes, to the overwhelming 
majority “trapped in realities” far more “restrictive and desperate.”202 The admittedly 
one-sided representation here is meant only for the purposes of elucidating the conditions 
of humans (consumers) that are pertinent to Stiegler's text.  
There is now a further question about the inconsistency in Stiegler's world-view, 
which seems compatible to the given contemporary conditions and yet at odds with it. 
Lanier states, there are a few who are “lords” of the (computing) cloud and can “connect 
the crowds.”203 What reigns at the centre of the digital hive of floating information and 
search engine data is advertising.204 As Allison sees it, not only are toy objects created to 
“appeal” to needs and desires of kids but that they also “tether” them to a “New Age 
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capitalist imagination.”205 These processes and their ends are not visible to the 
consumers. We see why in Stiegler’s own account of discrete (digital) images: “The 
image is always discrete as discreetly as possible...If it were discrete indiscreetly…its 
discreteness would have no effect on us.”206 It is only by being discrete or by foreclosing 
understanding (knowledge) that toys can be animated and the faith in information (and 
the hive) be sustained.  
Zengotita observes that the mediated human does not make distinctions between 
fabrications (such as facebook friends) and the necessary or real things (real pets for 
instance). This is because the “perceptual and cognitive categories” and the “rhythms of 
actions” that humans are living by are being “determined” by the daily inundation of 
these very entities that need to be distinguished.207  But the possibility of visual 
intelligence is tied to the same cognitive and perceptual categories. Zengotita’s 
observation suggests why such intelligence and critical perceptual capacity in a consumer 
(or mediated man) is unlikely to come about. To see why we have to notice that the 
mediated world described here is not a socio-cultural phenomenon. The observations of 
Zengotita, Allison, Lainer and others reveal more than alterations of human behaviour 
since these alterations are manifestations of the underpinning perceptual and thought 
processes that are being modified in profound ways.  
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2. Pleasure, addiction and massages 
 
A South Korean couple let their three-month-old baby starve to death while 
raising a virtual daughter online...The pair fed their own premature baby just once 
a day in between 12-hour stretches at an Internet café...An autopsy showed her 
death was caused by a long period of malnutrition.  
-BBC News, 5th March 2010208 
 
Rewards are a category of things that powerfully reinforce behaviours.209 
Physiological rewards like food and those associated with the sexual propagation of a 
species (including parenting) are primary or natural reinforcers of behaviour. These are 
naturally present. When neutral stimuli (colour, light) are associated with these rewards it 
leads to “instrumental learning” or “conditioning” in animals. The phenomenon is well 
recorded in “classic and contemporary animal learning theory.”210 Humans also possess 
these responses to rewards or what are called ‘reward systems’ as an evolutionary 
endowment from a long biological ancestry. 
In animals such as bees, it has been noted that the ‘internal reward system’ is 
already highly developed and the association of a certain stimuli and reward is easily 
learnt: “Immediately after a single, short learning trial, behaviour is precisely under the 
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control of the newly acquired information.”211 Once a reward has been associated with a 
stimulus the association is learnt and the brain codes the ‘value’ of the stimuli for the 
organism. The probability of getting a future reward and the importance of the reward are 
learnt and retained internally.212 Crucially, the single trial learning of the stimuli 
predisposes perception, receptivity to learning and the retaining of stimuli related 
information without the conscious control or awareness of the organism.213  
The reward systems of the brain are also what are called the “pleasure centers of 
the brain.”214 The associated chemical (neurotransmitter), dopamine, acts at the interface 
where “emotions are translated into actions.”215 It is believed that aside from the affective 
experience of pleasure, memory, motivation, behaviour as well as the ability to pay 
attention are implicated in the release of this chemical.216 The level of dopamine, which is 
altered by ‘rewards,’ can then affect the organism at the level of its most basic and core 
functionalities.  
There are a few things to be noted here. Firstly, the brain does not create a causal 
relation or even look for one that may connect the stimuli and the reward.217 This may be 
how the “message modules” of advertising function. Since the brain does not causally 
look for how the stimuli codes for the reward, cars can code for sex and credit cards for 
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happiness. It wouldn't seem surprising then that “advertisers even carry out research to 
test the degree of sexual arousal accompanying certain campaigns.”218 Advertisers 
admittedly aim to create “rewarding” experiences for consumers.219  
Secondly, the brain does not seem to code the reward associated with each stimuli 
but ascribes a value to the stimulus according to the importance of the reward. This is 
called ‘salience.’220 This means that the stimulus is retained in the memory of the 
organism after learning occurs. In the field of advertising, such retention - of the logo, 
message, and the attitude or (buying) behaviour targeted through the reward - is studied 
and scientifically applied.221 A book on advertising outlines the relation between 
psychology and advertising:  
Since the turn of the 20th century advertisers have tried to explain consumer 
behaviour with the help of psychological theory, seeking to unlock advertising 
effectiveness with the key of individual motivations and desires. Between 1943 
and 1954, 7,000 psychologists joined US advertising firms...222 
The advertising barrages, message-modules and massages are actively targeting human 
motivational capacities underlying a whole host of human mental capacities. This process 
is a non-intrusive way of coaxing human beings along certain paths of desired behaviour 
by adjusting an individual’s alertness as well as his unconscious internal mechanisms of 
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attending to and responding to everything that surrounds him. This suggests why the 
consumer may not be able to respond critically and intelligently to digital images or 
films, as Stiegler supposes. A consumer’s desires and motivations are directed to such 
images and are tied to the (passive) consumption of them and their associated products.  
Stimuli learnt through strong associations with natural reinforcers, such as sex or 
food, are likely to persist partly because of the limitations of brain structures. Edelman 
argues that the brain does not massively re-organise even in the face of radically new 
information. This is because of the predictive functionality of the brain that is based on 
the reward systems. The related finding from cognitive science is that the brain-mind is 
largely autopoietic and it’s functioning is mostly self-reflexive and automated.223 
Previous stores of knowledge and experience, then, mostly govern human learning. It can 
be argued from this that the increasingly mediated condition of all human (social) 
experience and the isolation or incarceration of the mediated men could very well result 
in constricted avenues of learning and thought. With regard to perception, the 
constrictions of learning imply reduced possibilities for new knowledge and critical 
apprehension on the part of consumers. This situation could be worsened by a consumer’s 
increasing dependence on and desire for the same mediated objects or images.  
 
Drug addiction is said to hijack the internal prediction mechanism of future 
rewards by motivating humans to seek certain chemicals over and above bodily and other 
basic social and personal needs. This happens primarily because these chemicals are able 
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to surpass the magnitude and duration of the chemicals called neurotransmitters (like 
dopamine) released for natural reinforcers.224 This implies that the drug acquires a high 
priority in the natural organisation of needs and drives and motivates behaviour to seek 
the particular drug beyond volitional control and the biological needs of the body. 
Crucially, the brain’s inbuilt reward system also “functions to preserve the motivational 
hierarchy of the different needs essential for the maintenance of the bodily, psychological 
and social equilibrium.”225 The reward system is then “essential for the maintenance of 
life” alongside the “organization and repetition of the innumerable learned habits.”226  
Furthermore, studies indicate that the sensitisation produced by drug use not only 
creates abnormal cravings and increased responsiveness to the drug but that it also makes 
the person less sensitive to “physiological increases in dopamine produced by natural 
reinforcers.”227 Different drugs are said to even induce changes in the morphology and 
genetic transcriptions as well as protein synthesis occurring in neuronal cells. In other 
words, adaptive changes brought on by the effects of drugs and its artificial stimulation 
could induce significant lasting modifications of the brain.228  
This also implies that artificial stimulation of the brain’s reward system - the 
system of evaluating and responding to rewards based on survival needs, modifies 
behaviour, motivation and other functionalities for the immediate and overweening 
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interest of the external stimuli and that it may well weaken human responsiveness to 
natural needs. This may be the case with the Korean couple reported in BBC.  
There is a continuing debate about whether or not “Internet Addiction” is a proper 
use of the term ‘addiction’ since it involves no substances and no psychiatric treatment 
exists for it.229 However, there is a clear case of “withdrawal symptoms” “nervousness,” 
“agitation,” and “insomnia” in excessive web usage.230 Also, there are “documented cases 
of homicide and suicide after being denied use of a computer game” and instances of  
“playing (a game) to the point of death from exhaustion.”231 One Internet addict describes 
his experience: “When I explore the online world, I feel like that robot in the movie Short 
Circuit. I need more input! More input!”232  
Drug use is said to “motivate the repetition of the behavior and creates a feeling 
of satisfaction like that produced by the completion of a biological imperative.”233 Such 
repetition seems to occur in the replay function of media transmission. Writer, critic 
Benjamin Demott calls this a “pathological culture of replay” where a war, disaster or 
any event at all is repeated by abstracting the location and particularity of the event.234 
This abstracted repetition also promises “endless return.” This is why 9-11 cannot be an 
event but a replay of fantasies and imaginations that pre-exist and were fed by the same 
replay culture. Baudrillard describes this as the “event being short-circuited by the 
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immediate image-feedback.”235 This way of perceiving images is a far cry from the 
critically engaged consumer gaze of Stiegler’s imagination.  
 Replay culture permeates places and objects too. DeMott quotes an account of 
the re-making or Disneyfication of Cairo where plans were being made to evict “onion 
and garlic sellers…and (bring) in troupes of actors to play the real people they would 
displace.”236 This kind of “repetition” – of watching repeats on news, “experiencing” 
cultural tourism in Cairo or consuming toy objects in succession, is also tied to a specific 
kind of satisfaction that drives them. Demott remarks that “replay is to violence porn (on 
televised media) and its hard man audience what bondage is to standard porn.”237 Allison 
describes something along similar lines: “As I was told often… the sensation that is also 
produced in the course of immersion in a Japanese playscape...is one of titillation, 
mastery and abundance.”238 This stimulating effect experienced by virtual gamers and 
Japanese toy lovers is what Kimberley Young describes as a “mindthrill” in her medical 
research on Internet addictions. The term can be understood with this description of drug 
addiction: 
...the intense euphoric rush experienced by the addict is short-lived and must be 
frequently reintroduced. Repeated exposure of the reward systems of the 
drugs...results in desensitisation…The addict must [then] take a larger dose of the 
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drug…which results in increased tolerance and the propagation of the addiction 
cycle…239 
It is also noteworthy that addictive drugs are understood to be chemicals 
“mimicking or interrupting the effect of - endogenous neurotransmitters (like dopamine) 
in brain communications.”240 Addictive drugs match specific neurotransmitters and may 
exert their effects through the systems of these neurotransmitters that reach many 
different parts of the brain.241 The “crossover quality” of the Japanese toy industry in 
Allison’s account works in a comparable fashion. Toys ‘match’ existing relations such as 
caring for a “real pet” as in the tamagotchi instance. The character of the toy in turn 
extends these properties to a whole range of products with a multiplier effect of both 
enchantment and profits. An “entertainment complex” of consumer goods capitalises on 
the qualities of Pokemons. This is called “stimulus generalisation” in advertising 
language where responses created by one stimulus are extended seamlessly over to 
others.242  
Such “play creations” are not only marketed with savvy marketing strategies but 
they also belong to the fantasy of “endless possibilities.”243 Allison writes, “Everything is 
at once fluid and boundless” in this “imaginary universe.”244 As the satisfaction of a drug 
is not lasting, the actions have to be repeated but each time with more options or with 
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games with greater and better “features.” The boundaries of this imaginary universe have 
to be pushed a little further each time. The desire to expand possibilities constantly is the 
desire for higher “doses” – for more and more data on the net or for acquiring more 
Pokemon pocket monsters. The world of expanding and never-ending options is, in short, 
addictive.  
 
In the mediated world, human capacities of thought and perception are being 
altered. They are being inscribed in advance by “indexes” given by media massages, 
consumer options and zombie media. The resulting changes are not merely phenomenal 
events that occur in particular instances of buying or surfing online but are significant 
modifications of patterns (neural pathways) of thinking and seeing. And these changes 
are evolving in the direction of addictions.  
In the article from Scientific American on the recent study on Internet addiction, 
the writer understands Friston’s remark that the brain adapts to particular needs to mean 
that the reported shrinking of the brain is not “necessarily a bad thing.245” He then quotes 
a “comparative” study done on the brains of cab drivers that revealed increased “gray 
matter” in areas related to spatial navigation and memory.246 What the writer misses in 
the comparison is that the latter reveals positive change (enhancement of existing 
capacity) while the study on addicts shows physical change that is largely negative. 
Adapting to become a video gamer seems to perpetuate the behaviour of gaming by 
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depleting the relevant capacities of decision-making. That the writer of the said article 
misses this difference is equally telling.   
In conclusion, Stiegler’s argument that consumers will intelligently and critically 
perceive images and construct new ones as a result of digital technology is based on a 
misguided premise. Stiegler draws on historical outcomes, such as those related to 
alphabetization, to support his thesis on digitisation but in doing so he overlooks the fact 
that the ontological facts about humans are undergoing significant change. The 
inhabitants of the mediated world are adapting to fit its realities in the same way that the 
elisions of current conceptions of humans in neuroscience and philosophy fit the world of 
estranged humans. It appears that the possibility of new intentions and a critical and 
intelligent gaze is precisely what is at stake in the present situation.  
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Chapter 3: Modern Technics and the Hope for Human capacities 
 
1. Stiegler’s technics and Modern Technology 
 
In the first chapter, I have argued that the concept of technicisation for Stiegler is 
a process through which all human possibilities are articulated in advance, beyond human 
autonomy and as an inheritance (past) given to man. This conception of technicisation 
also underpins modern or contemporary technics and the anticipation of its promising 
future in ‘The Discrete Image.’ Stiegler is certain that consumers will critically and 
analytically apprehend images and that this possibility is implied by the nature of 
contemporary digital technology. His optimism, often bordering on millenarian hope, and 
partly based on a general conception of technical evolution, commits him to an urgency 
and necessity that is antithetical to the promise of a dynamic critique held up in ‘The 
Discrete Image.’  It forecloses a critical apprehension of the dynamics of technological 
evolution specific to contemporary digital technologies whose consideration would throw 
light on the real obstacles facing the realisation of radical possibilities such as visual 
literacy.  
Stiegler’s thesis proposes that technics in general create systems of references for 
the positive constitution of human conditions, but in the present situation such a system 
of references does not seem to exist and is causing a sense of disorientation. In his 
account of the state of technology in contemporary society in the second volume of 
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Technics and Time, he writes that at present “we are suffering from disorientation as 
such.”247 “Cardinal orientation” is not occurring.248 In ‘The Discrete Image’ too Stiegler 
states that new technologies have engendered “a phantasmagoria” that is giving rise to “a 
dangerous doubt which affects democracy, a doubt which is not far from panic, and 
which is decomposing the social bond…”249 He states that the gap between technical 
systems and “social organisation…[is]…dramatically widening” and their final “divorce 
seems inevitable.”250 Elsewhere, Stiegler begins a speech by stating that societies today 
are “sick and suffering…[and]…in need of care.”251 Such emphasis on a dismal state of 
affairs may appear opposed to the general positive tone of the ‘The Discrete Image’ but 
these contradictory positions when seen together reveal the millenarian tendencies in 
Stiegler’s arguments. His thesis, it would appear, suggests the end of the current world 
order and the birth of a new, glorious future that is close at hand. Stiegler insists for 
instance that these very digital technologies that underlie the said disorientation also 
make “possible and necessary” certain “new teleologies” or futures.252  
In Stiegler’s analysis, the wonderful new possibilities of digital technics are 
particularly important in view of previous analog technologies. The latter are the 
audiovisual technologies associated with the advent of mass media in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. Stiegler argues that these technologies had deprived individuals of certain 
possibilities:  
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…the separation of the functions of production and consumption deprive 
producers and consumers of their knowledge, and consequently of their capacities 
of participation in the socialisation of the world through its trans-formation.253 
Such a transformative participation was possible with earlier technics such as language. 
Through interlocution one person could express oneself in a “singular fashion,” but also 
speech allowed for the transformation of the language shared by the speakers. These are 
processes of individuation wherein “an ‘I’ is constituted in the midst of a ‘we,’ such 
that... [the individuation of the I] is simultaneously the individuation of the group to 
which... [I belongs].”254 With audiovisual mass media technologies (such as television), 
where dialogic exchange does not take place, the processes of individuation, Stiegler 
argues, were “short-circuited.”255 Analog mass media technologies engendered passivity 
of consumers in front of radios and television sets with no possibility of responding or 
reciprocating to what is received, seen or heard within the media itself.  
Participative possibilities are available yet again with the new digital 
technologies. The new forms of these technologies create the means for the psychical 
individuation of humans (constitution of the “I”), which is tied to processes of collective 
individuation of social milieus (the “we”). Stiegler also emphasises that modern technics 
have created “absolutely original processes of psychical and collective individuation.”256 
Crucially, he suggests that the opposition of the producer/consumer is suppressed by 
these new technologies because consumers addressed by digital media are able to respond 
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in the language of the media itself. Stiegler states that with online “social 
networks…addressees are always also senders” as it was earlier with language where 
listeners who understood a language could also speak.257 This is the basis of the radical 
argument given in the conclusion of the ‘The Discrete Image’ that states that the relation 
of consumers of images to producers (those in the domain of the culture industry) can be 
modified.258 Technology, Stiegler states, is “giving us the chance” to do so.259  
Stiegler argues further that the modern technics or digital media are our only hope 
in the midst of the disorientation and sickness in society. With regards to the systems of 
telecommunications that are threatening the state of democracy, he argues that the 
“technologies are also the only possible avenue for the invention of new forms of social 
bonds, that is also of civil peace.”260 This possibility extends beyond the political to the 
society at large - “(technics) is the only avenue if we are to avoid the impasse 
constraining humanity today.”261 A similar urgency underlies the need to “seize” the 
chance that digitisation technologies are giving us.262 This insistence on a singular path to 
the glorious future also betrays millenarian inflections in Stiegler’s thesis on modern 
technics.  
The insistent emphasis on technology as the only avenue for a glorious future also 
contributes to a strong sense of advocacy for new technologies or at least an overriding 
optimism in ‘The Discrete Image.’ This is reflected in the text where repeated 
pronouncements are made about the inevitable gains of digital technology and its 
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promises. Stiegler speaks of the appearance of this new discrete image as “a great event 
specific to the end of the twentieth century, which will make itself felt, there can be no 
question.”263 The gain in human capacities is pre-supposed by technology: “...evolution 
of technical synthesis implies the evolution of spectatorial synthesis.”264 These new 
technologies will engender “...a great crisis, a generalized questioning… (and) an 
extremely dynamic power of analysis” will be born.265  
There is also a strong necessity associated with seizing the opportunity of modern 
technology given that the other option is stagnation or an “impasse” as Stiegler sees it. 
Furthermore, the text itself derives from two lectures given to art students and artists who 
presumably are in a position to consider adopting the technology or have already done so. 
These talks are then addressed to likely “consumers” of technology who are also 
“producers” of images that would be seen and possibly “read” by other classes of 
consumers. Given this context, Stiegler's address is implicated in the politics of 
supporting the (urgent) uptake of new technology among artists who are a relatively 
influential class of “consumers,” while insisting too that this in itself is sufficient to 
overcome the divide of producers and consumers. But while promising critical access to 
the (digital) image-object, Stiegler overlooks the need to critically access (or assess) the 
processes that have been inscribing and giving in advance the forms of digital 
technology. He also does not consider how these inscriptions might affect the positive 
possibilities that technologies might give.  
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The overwhelming optimism in Stiegler’s arguments regarding digital 
technologies arguably stems at least in part from the assumption of a general process of 
technicisation. In the earlier discussion in Chapter 1, the nature of technicisation was 
described as the process that produces the advance on future possibilities. This process is 
unchanging and Stiegler considers it to be true of all technical evolution throughout 
history. Stiegler writes that all “technical objects go on to overtake their makers.”266 This 
implies that technical objects engender new possibilities (or advances) that are seen and 
realised years after their making. This is illustrated in the instance of the steam engine. 
Decades after the invention of James Watt’s steam engine the next generation of 
“inventors and innovators” found “various applications for its use.” 267 By then Watt’s 
patent had expired. Such a process is what Stiegler implies by the “evolutionary logic” 
that is proper to technical systems. He argues that technics are moved by their own 
“dynamic” and are “marked by particular tendencies.”268 This supports the non-
anthropocentric view of technics that Stiegler insists on. This conception of technics sees 
it as an “end unto itself.” Tehnics are not mere products of human endeavour and creation 
and can engender possibilities beyond the knowledge of their makers.269 This conception 
of technics supports Stiegler’s project of according a distinct “ontological status” to 
technical objects that has been denied them in the history of philosophy.270  
The movement of technics stemming from its self-evolution produces advances; it 
also causes “disorientation.” The evolution of technical systems in general causes 
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“disruption, disadjustment, inadequation...” in society.271  Such “disorientation”, Stiegler 
argues is “originary to technicity” in all of its forms.272 While the “speed of technical 
development” has accelerated since the “Industrial Revolution,” Stiegler argues that 
acceleration itself is at the heart of the general “process of exteriorization.”273 This 
originary disruption caused by technical evolution is most evident in the industrial 
revolution, which has also revealed the “dynamic specific to technical beings” and the 
“evolutionary logic” of technical systems.274 In general:  
The technical system is constantly evolving and rendering the ‘other systems’ that 
structure social cohesion null and void...technical change...disrupts familiar 
reference points of which all culture consists. 275  
In other words, any new human possibility is tied to the crisis that is bound to occur as a 
result of evolving technologies. This relation is more evident in Stiegler’s interpretation 
of the Greek myth about origins wherein “prometheia as foresight and epimetheia as both 
unconcerned distraction and after-thought” are brought together “inextricably,” giving 
mortals both “fear and hope.”276 In the text, Stiegler sums this up as: “The relation to the 
analog image is going to be… thrown into crisis, it is going to open up a critical access to 
the image.” 277 This is to say that digital technologies being intrinsically manipulable will 
disrupt the belief that what is seen in the image ‘has been.’ In the absence of this belief 
critical access to the image becomes possible. This relation of crisis and positive futures 
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in Stiegler’s philosophy may explain the tendency for millenarianism in his arguments 
about modern technics. 
But the generalised concept of technicisation as a self-evolving process and that 
producing crisis and futures of itself has problematic implications. Firstly, the self-
evolving and independent determination of technics and technical objects implies that 
human organisations- social or political- do not bear a causal relation to technical 
evolution (at least not in a dominant sense). The visions and desires of humans and 
human organisations that may give in advance the possibilities of modern technology are 
disallowed in Stiegler’s thought. This foreclosure can be attributed to Stiegler’s 
designation of technicisation as the origin of differance - the enabling movement that 
produces all concepts.278 In Stiegler’s account, processes of technicisation are that which 
produce the general process of writing that Derrida describes. But that which produces 
the writing underlying all writing- signs, all signified and signifiers, is itself the only one 
that is not written. The process of inscription and also digitisation is conceived in this 
way as free of all inscriptions that may come before it or of advances that might gives its 
possibilities. 
Secondly, Stiegler’s arguments support a whole range of equivalences of 
techniques and technologies across time that underwrites the optimism that the new 
digital technologies will open new and very productive possibilities. For instance Stiegler 
writes: “we have been living since Greece in the critical era of the relation to language 
that gave rise to logic, philosophy, science, etc...What happens first with the analog and, 
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now, with the analogico-digital is of the same order.”279 This is also indicated in 
Stiegler’s argument that the “photonic -including digital- material is nothing but a 
particular case of this ‘appallingly ancient’ labor.”280 The ancient labor here refers to the 
process of filling a lack of memory through a process of exteriorisation through technics. 
Such a view takes present technologies as mere manifestations of a process that is 
fundamentally the same throughout history. Such a conception of technics operates a 
historical leveling that further masks the motivations, visions and decisions that may 
determine (or give in advance) forms of contemporary technology and its dynamics.  
 
While Stiegler does not consider the historical specificity of contemporary 
technologies, his general concept of technicisation arguably describes the kinds of 
technical forms envisioned and designed in contemporary times. Stiegler states his 
philosophical debt to Karl Marx and others who have theorised technical evolution, 
which “permits” his conception of technical objects as distinct from both physical (inert) 
objects and organic (living) beings.281 But what distinguishes the contribution of 
Stiegler’s philosophy on technics owes much more to the techno-scientific discourses of 
the last 50 years. The visions, endeavours and achievements of techno-science of creating 
autonomous technical objects possessing their own “dynamic” (that is not reducible to 
“the aggregate or product” of inert and living objects) is historically specific to the era 
beginning with cybernetics in late 1950’s. These can be seen as preceding and possibly 
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informing Stiegler’s thought. Arguably, the techno-science of the past half-century 
creates the advance that makes Stiegler’s own philosophy possible.   
Autonomous technical objects are a relatively recent conception within science. 
Arguably, the first historic instantiation of a technical being that possessed a ‘dynamic’ in 
that it was self-correcting and learning (hence evolving) came with cybernetics. Norbert 
Weiner, a scientist who is often regarded as the ‘father of cybernetics’ and also associated 
with envisioning artificial intelligence, describes “learning”, “self-propagating” and “self-
organising” machines, in a book published in 1965.282 He states in the introduction of the 
second edition of the book  that these theories were no longer a program for the future but 
an “existing science.”283 This was presumably not the case when he wrote the first edition 
in 1948. John Johnston uses the phrase “machinic life” to describe self-animated and 
intelligent technical beings. These he argues are characterised by a capacity to “alter 
themselves” that did not exist in previous automata such as the mechanical dolls of earlier 
centuries.284 The earliest imaginations of “machinic life” mimicked life processes (as in 
cybernetics) but they were also of an “altogether different form of life” that was “not 
fully answerable to the ontological priority and sovereign prerogatives of the organic, 
biological realm.” 285 These paved the way for the new kinds of sovereign endeavors of 
Artificial Life (AL). A proponent of the field, Christopher Langton, describes such 
endeavors in the mid 90’s: 
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…[AL is] free to explore nature as it could have been- as it could still be if we 
realise artificially what did not occur naturally…much of it will be relevant on its 
own right… 286   
Johnston also remarks on this autonomy accorded to new machinic forms in AL.287 Such 
autonomy imagined for and articulated in the design of “artificial beings” is evidenced in 
a range of disciplines today including molecular nano-technology, genetic engineering, 
neural engineering and AL. Nano-technology is concerned with creating self-replicating 
bodies from molecules (inorganic forms) while genetic engineering promises the creation 
of life-forms to specifications. Neural-computer integration is engaged in creating brains 
(autonomous minds) on microchips. It should be clear from the above that the efforts of 
creating “organised inorganic beings” or technics with a dynamic of their own has 
expanded in prominence, scale and diversity in the recent decades. This is the context that 
lends force to Stiegler’s project of granting technical objects an independent ontological 
status and may even be said to be over-determining his conception of technics.  
The recent discourses of “post-humanism” too share a striking comparison to 
Stiegler’s concept of technics. Post-humanism, scholars note, purports the belief in 
artificial or prosthetic means of evolving beyond the physical bounds of human bodies.288 
Others suggest that post-humanism would be the end of the “man-centered” universe.”289 
Man here is seen as merged or coupled with machinic states. Although a recent 
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development in theory (of less than two decades), this discourse of post-humanism is 
arguably gaining ground alongside the projects of techno-science, anticipating and paving 
the way for a complete merger of man and machine. Post-humanistic thought in general 
would correlate well with Stiegler’s non-anthropocentric view of technics. But the 
extended future that post-humanism proclaims is antithetical to the political and critical 
human possibilities that Stiegler envisions in so far as the human as an ontological entity 
at the center of our concerns is subsumed and gone beyond in the post-human future. 
Stiegler presumably does not conceive of a future when men and machines are merged 
although his conception of the human is also far from the “liberal humanistic subject” as 
human agency and choice are eroded by his project of granting autonomy to technics.290 
Neither would Stiegler embrace a future of disembodied post-humans as his 
philosophical interests remain humanistic in articulating epistemological and political 
possibilities specific to humans. This forms the central paradox of Stiegler’s position - on 
the one hand he argues for the autonomy of technical objects but on the other his thought 
remains committed to human concerns. Techno-scientific visions, which are otherwise 
well aligned and even productive for Stiegler’s thought, are also at once discontinuous 
with his humanistic hope. Such discontinuities will be returned to and commented on in 
the concluding section of this chapter.  
 
The brief overview of techno-scientific imaginations and endeavours along with 
post-humanistic discourses goes to indicate the relatively recent history of ontologically 
distinct, self-evolving and dynamic technical beings. In view of this historical specificity, 
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it can be argued that the conception of technics that Stiegler proposes has been envisaged 
from the vantage point of modern science beginning in the latter half of 20th century. This 
time period, not incidentally, is Stiegler’s own lifetime. Stiegler may not be envisioning a 
future man-machine merger (as in post-humanism) but the philosophical underpinnings 
of his thought are grounded in contemporary techno-science and its recent past. Nietzsche 
critiqued such a problem calling it “the original failing of philosophers” wherein 
everything asserted “about humanity…is basically nothing more than testimony about the 
human being of a very restricted stretch of time.”291 He describes further that many 
“inadvertently take the most recent shape of human beings, as it emerged under…specific 
political events, as the fixed form from which we must proceed.”292 Stiegler conceives 
the emergence of man as tied to the process of technicisation which itself is grounded in 
the imaginations of recent techno-science.293 The problematic extension of historically 
specific conditions and its technologies all the way back to the beginning of man 
becomes the basis for claiming “eternal facts” about both technics and man.294  
Without conceiving of modern technology as belonging to an eternal process of 
technicistaion, contemporary technologies may instead be studied for specific 
“tendencies” or “dynamics” that have marked and over-determined its evolution in the 
time period beginning in the 1950’s. As remarked earlier, this is the period that pertains 
to the active pursuits of various forms of autonomous technicities that have been 
expanding in scale, scope and systematicity. Such pursuits, of which the creation of 
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digital technology is itself a part, I will argue, are inscribed with the Cold War 
imperatives of “control.” These technologies are further inscribed and over-determined 
by the institutional objectives of research laboratories leveraging and enhancing their 
technological prowess for profits and federal military funds, and the industry’s interests 
of gaining control over labor movements and workers. This merger of interests of 
military, industry and science in this time period is often termed the “military-industrial-
academic complex.”295  
This merger, I contend, also sets in place a self-reinforcing dynamic or movement 
that pertains to techno-scientific research and its processes. This becomes evident in the 
fascination with ever-greater automation and escalating performance prerogatives in the 
design of technologies. This dynamic is not restricted, however, to the domain of the 
creation of technologies but extends almost seamlessly to mass culture. It is not by 
chance either that the designation of a class of people as “consumers” begins to occur in 
the 20th century and particularly in the latter half of the century. As Stiegler notes 
elsewhere, the creation of the consumer is closely tied to the creation of “public opinion” 
and the pioneering work of Edward Bernays in the area of ‘public relations’ in the same 
era.296  Mass consumption is a phenomenon of the latter half of the 20th century.297  
For these reasons, there is a particularity to the era in question that goes to inform 
the context of ‘The Discrete Image.’ The over-determinations and the self-reinforcing 
dynamic described above both inform the form of the digital technology and have a 
bearing on the possibilities proposed by Stiegler. The following discussion will explicate 
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how they inform the creation of new digital technologies as well as consumer realities. 
The question of new possibilities given by new technologies will be addressed again in 
light of these discussions.   
 
2.   Modern Technics – Inscriptions and Dynamics 
In a book on the history of invention written in 1954, Norbert Weiner states that 
the greatest invention of Thomas Alva Edison was the “industrial scientific 
laboratory.”298 Edison innovates the structure of “a moderately trained crew of 
technicians” working under the directions of a “central mind” and for profits.299 While 
science adopts an industrial system, industry too ventures into the business of science. By 
1921, there were more than 500 laboratories functional in industrial establishments across 
the United States.300 Collaborations of military and industry were also well underway by 
this time and were further cemented by the First World War.  
The Second World War signaled an even greater convergence of military, 
industry and scientific research. The atomic bomb, some have noted, was a watershed 
moment in modern science and technology.301 This marked the advent of “megabuck 
science” as Weiner describes it.302 In the late 1960’s, the US federal spending on research 
and development rose to $10 billion, of which half came from the Department of 
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Defense.303 The heady wartime success with the bomb and the “specter” of “Soviet 
expansion” informed the post War ideology of “national preparedness.”304 The result was 
the institution of a “permanent wartime economy” based on “close ties between the 
military and industry, war production in peacetime...ongoing peacetime weapons (techno-
scientific) research.”305  
Paul Edwards calls this paradigm of operations and its particular language the 
“closed world.” The central metaphor of this discourse was “containment” – an “enclosed 
space surrounded and sealed by American power.”306 The operations of the closed world 
included the total enterprise of undertakings (of the permanent war economy) that went 
into supporting the visions of a “centrally controlled, automated global power.”307 
“Closed world” included the visions of extending US military power to enclose the 
Soviet Union, visions of enclosing the capitalistic system at home by protecting it from 
communist influences and of extending the capitalist system so as to enclose the globe.308 
This is not to attribute the causality of the forms of modern techno-science solely to the 
military. The “closed world” image of a centrally controlled enclosure is equally 
applicable to undertakings of the industry and the techno-scientific research community. 
For instance, after the Second World War factory owners sought to seal off production 
facilities from any definitive influences of labour unions and external socio-cultural 
forces, and humans in general, and in doing so they too envisioned and articulated a 
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“closed world.” The story of modern techno-science has to be noted as one of “multiple 
determination” as Edwards notes.309 Modern technics that according to Stiegler, over-
determines human relations is itself over-determined by such “closed world” 
imaginations.  
“Control,” is central to the “closed world” ideology for it is through control that 
the enclosed space of this world is both defined and sustained. Control simply put is any 
“purposive influence” on behaviour according to a predetermined goal, as James Beniger 
describes it in his book Control Revolution.310  “Communication” is central to “control” 
in this definition- both the communication of goals to the controlled as well as feedback 
to the controller.311 Norbert Weiner proposes that the message (goal communication) and 
feedback loop are common to both operations within machines as well as operations 
between machines and people (operators).312 The generalisation of the concept of control 
offered a means of addressing human-machine integration problems that were central to 
the “closed world discourse” – where all human and machine components needed to 
“function seamlessly.”313 It is important to note the convergence of control and 
communication or rather the inclusion of communication and feedback systems within 
control systems for this provided the basis for envisioning and creating autonomous 
technical beings. Digitisation technology is indebted by this legacy and the intentions and 
aspirations for such “control” in a closed world.  
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In designing the kinds of systems that automatically accepted the criteria of 
“control” in this new sense as most desirable, scientific undertakings and thinking too 
were being inscribed with the language of control. This can be well illustrated with the 
case of the neurosciences.  
Literature of the brain sciences is replete with the language of automaticity and 
control. “Control” is argued to be the central aspect of the study of the brain, in that 
neural systems are also seen as “control” systems.314 Majority of current cognitive 
science research is devoted to addressing the so-called self-looping, inward focused 
characteristic of the brain. The brain in this account is the seat of centralised control. 
Barbara Stafford calls this “the new interiority” characterised by an “intense, one-way 
experimental focus.”315 More alarmingly perhaps, the two basic functionalities of the 
brain - that of an inward focused operation and a primarily outward directed attention – 
are labeled “automatic” and “controlled processes.”316 The outward directed attention is 
the voluntary or willed aspect of the mind.317 Neuroscientists seem to have solved the 
problem of human will quite easily by modeling it as a control mechanism. The 
subsumption of the volition of “will” by the mechanisation of “control” highlights the 
extent of conceptual distortion occurring in scientific imagination. The urgency of brain 
science to rid human mental capacities (including intention and will) is underwritten by 
control metaphors.  
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Besides the over-determination of scientific language and vision by “control,” 
scientific research also evolved a dynamic that furthered the interest in “control” and 
automated technical beings. This dynamic or self-reinforcing pattern that will be 
elaborated here bears comparison to the pattern of addiction discussed in Chapter 2.  
Firstly, the relations between scientific research and the military established a 
techno-scientific community that was closely allied with the “closed world” dreams of 
control. Researchers were acclimatised to the military needs through “mechanisms of 
education, funding, reward-structures and peer pressure.”318  Writing in 1971 in the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the scientist Edward Teller notes that the “most 
impressive” fact about research in the new large-scale scientific enterprises was “the 
relative ease with which the scientific community had adapted itself to the demands (of 
the military).”319 The researchers and scientists were acquiring the habits of (perfect) 
“communication” in relation to thinking and aligning themselves to the objectives of the 
military (and allied industries). But this was not a passive learning process. Scientists and 
engineers at the design level “spurred the arms race in directions unforeseen by military 
planners.”320 Universities were seeking to maximise the largess of the military and “to 
increase their social power and control by amassing technical resources and research 
capital.”321  The relations between the military and techno-scientific research instituted in 
the Cold War and retained since, is of the order of a mutual dependency that legitimised 
and furthered the imaginations of centralised control and power. Scientific research in the 
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pursuit of “control” based technologies acquired a self-reinforcing dynamic that has 
given the “advance” on all its visions and processes.  
This operative dynamic in techno-science can be seen in the patterns of funding 
being funneled repeatedly into the same institutions and their increasing investment in the 
most advanced technologies. Few universities, about 25 of them, which are mostly 
private, Margarent O'Mara notes, had the capacities to carry out “high-level” experiments 
at the beginning of the Cold War (relationships between the military and these elite 
universities had already been established before this).322  Since then the allocation of 
funds to places of “greatest expertise and resources” has become a “self-fulfilling 
prophesy.”323 The self-reinforcing patterns of funding have created high fortresses of 
laboratories filled with massively complex and expensive equipment that steadily grew in 
the numbers of “technicians,” resources and power. The elitism (centralised control) in 
scientific research created by this funding pattern has become “deeply entrenched.”324  
This self-reinforcing pattern also describes the relation of scientific research and 
technology understood here as instruments, gadgets or computer based systems. First of 
all, scientific research became more and more committed to the use of these technologies 
in its own processes. The new science is characterised by instrument-based research 
supported by the concomitant “ontological” belief that “elementary particles” can explain 
all higher complexity.325 Accordingly, across the board, “physicists, biologists, chemists” 
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are exploring the minute regions of 10-4 to 10-6 cm and even smaller ones with their 
instruments.326 This ontological belief is of the order of a “closed world” where the 
smallest particles dictate the largest organisation within higher organisms and a seamless 
continuum of control exists within. Driven by this belief, scientific research became 
increasingly invested in high-tech instruments for its inquiries, processes and also for 
devising the very questions that it seeks to answer.   
Secondly, the same pattern is seen in scientists envisioning and creating ever 
more complex and high performance technologies. In the instance of the MIT 
undertaking of numerical control design for use in production facilities, the aggressive 
canvassing by the university (to both the military and to the industry) expanded the scope 
of the project. The scope was re-defined by MIT along more “ambitious” lines with a 
“heavy dependence upon the most advanced computational capability (that was being 
developed in MIT itself).”327 Numerical control machines were however operationally 
unwieldy and required new, expensive computer hardware and software as opposed to 
simpler tape-controlled machines. But the latter were not considered and this alternative 
was actively foreclosed by MIT in spite of practical and operational advantages. The 
drive behind this, that may be generalized, was to push the limits of technology.  
Others have noted that the concept of “techno-performance” or high performance 
technology became the “research paradigm” since the Cold War.328 Jon McKenzie states 
further that in responding to the military demands for “increasingly complex weaponry, 
engineers and other applied scientists pushed the limits of entire systems...creating higher 
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and higher standards of technological performance.”329 A military planner stated that the 
Research & Development establishment “pushes against the technological frontiers” and 
that “technologists…sell hardware that often take us far beyond the point that mere 
prudence requires...”330 Scientific research during Cold War years and thereafter, 
although over-determined by closed-world containment goals, had acquired a dynamic of 
its own. This is why scientists and technologists could aspire beyond the point of 
“prudence” into the more abstract and theoretically limitless zones of high-performance.  
A similar self-reinforcing dynamic operates within the larger consumer society as 
seen in the relations of toys (techno-objects) in Japan for instance. McKenzie notes too 
that high performance devices “have made their way into everyday lives, thereby 
generalising the concept of technological high performance.”331 Such a “gadgeteering 
craze” (what Lenny Bruce calls “hi-fi nuts332”) is pervasive in all strata of consumer 
society today and a similarly strong imperative exists behind the perceived need to have 
the most advanced technology at one’s disposal. The work of psychology and the brain 
sciences have contributed to the shaping of the consumer world and its conditions. 
The sciences of the mind while being themselves inscribed by the languages of 
control and adapted to the imperatives of the “closed world” discourse also became 
instrumental for industry. Historians note that mass communications as a field of research 
emerges in the Cold War period. And the military-industrial complex also funded 
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research in psychology and related social sciences.333 The knowledge from cognitive and 
brain sciences on the one hand was put to use for the militaristic purposes of designing 
effective training programs for weapons operators  and on the other these were also being 
employed in training the minds of consumers.334 fMRI techniques and brain studies lend 
themselves easily to studies of consumer behaviour and decision-making.335 A whole new 
field of such initiatives that cater to the needs of businesses is now extant - 
neuromarketing.336 Such applications of science continue the legacy of industry (since the 
earlier half of 20th century) deploying its resources, including access to mind sciences, 
and media and communications tools towards, what Chomsky calls, the “control of the 
public mind.”337 The resulting effects, pathologies and addictions were discussed earlier 
in Chapter 2. “Control” in the closed world discourse in this way extends from 
laboratories into mass culture and arguably also to the mental space of consumers.  
The preceding discussion brings to light a powerful impediment to realising the 
positive effects of contemporary technologies, such as an analytical and critical towards 
digital images. This is partly because new technologies already come inscribed with 
intentionalities and imperatives of control. The specters of the Cold War appear to have 
given in advance the possibilities of techno-scientific research and its imperatives in 
creating automated technologies. A self-reinforcing dynamic operates in the design, 
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creation of technologies and in their existence as consumer objects. A transformed 
critical perception and its synthetic possibilities that Stiegler envisions may exist at the 
theoretical level as aspects of these technologies, but the consumer has to overcome the 
impressive obstacles (or advances) given in the forms of these very technologies and in 
his own existence as a consumer for the said possibilities to be realised. These obstacles 
will become more evident by considering the specific case of seeing in the context of 
digital technology.  
 
3. Perceptual possibilities with modern technics 
 
Paul Virilio refers to media technologies as the “spoils of war.”338 But war too 
was undergoing changes in the 20th century. Visualisation, as he notes, had become an 
important part of war: 
…the technicians version of an all seeing Divinity...the drive is on for a general 
system of illumination that will allow everything to be seen and known, at every 
moment and in every place.339  
The divine all seeing eye belongs to the discourse of the “closed world” and the need for 
centralised control. But this rendering visible of everything was not for sight but for 
action as destruction. Virilio quotes, W.J.Perry, a former US. Chief Secretary of Defense, 
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that “once you see the target; you can expect to destroy it.”340 In other words, the 
perception of the new image technologies is for weapons that preclude the time gap 
needed to grasp what is seen. Kittler argues that with the digital technologies not only is 
“perception time” circumvented but “the time of so-called thinking” too.341 In scientific 
vocabulary this kind of seeing is that of a “zombie agent”- a seeing that does not give rise 
to “phenomenal sensations” which are unique experiences stemming from conscious 
understanding. This seeing is not remembered either, as it bypasses “working memory” 
and also leaves no traces on long-term memory.342 Zombie seeing is central to machines 
and automation in combat realities and to technology at large. The language of pixels is 
the language of bits that only machines can transcribe. The pixel as the basis of digital 
technologies is articulated with the end of making information “transmissible from an 
interstellar level.” 343 In doing so, knowledge is “decoupled” from the earthly 
inhabitants.344 
To this we must add the future possibility of a completely inorganic or technical 
perception. In a speculative paper on this future a robotics researcher, Hans Moravec, 
describes a seeing that bypasses the visual apparatus and sends images straight to the 
brain.345 In this future where “laser beams directly stimulate the retinal rods and cones of 
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the eye,” just as it is already occurring in advanced military technologies, there will be no 
image left to critique.346 
As Kittler notes, the “history of optical media is the history of disappearance.”347 
Quite literally, the seeing of a digital image requires the disappearance or effacement of 
the pixel. This was not the case always. Paint on canvas was as visible as was the scene 
or form depicted in the painting.348 But in the digital image the pixel is made to 
disappear. To critically access the image and analyse forms and composites defined by 
pixels the spectator would have to resort to the aid of the computer and analytical 
software which alone can “read” the bits of pixels. The literacy of the new discrete image 
in other words does not lie in the domain of human knowledge but with the world of 
computers and information.  
Furthermore, Kittler notes that unlike traditional media (up to the early modern 
times), contemporary media are “developed strategically to override the senses.” 349 
Contemporary media have standards such as the frames per second of films that are 
“based on measurements of the abilities and inabilities of visual perception.”350 The 
accepted current standard of twenty-four frames per second in films was “intentionally 
chosen exactly because (human) eyes and eyelids are unable to attain it.”351 Media 
standards such as these are “commercial compromises,” writes Kittler. Such 
compromises do not capture the benefits of discoveries made in research and 
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development.352 This is because, as technologies that suit centralised and hierarchical 
control in their very form, digital technologies are easily subject to the prerogatives of the 
industry. This was evident in one of the first applications of computer technology when 
the programming language called APT was designed for automated production. This was 
a highly proprietary language that could not be easily modified and which only offered 
stratified commands that placed limits on small manufacturers developing applications in 
APT or adopting it to suit their needs.353  
We may conclude from the above that the seeing in digital technologies is over-
determined by the demands of accelerated war and its vision for destruction and seeing 
for machine communication on the one hand and by the imperatives of commercial 
enterprises on the other. The possibility of critical access to images is not totally effaced 
but it is clearly undermined.  
Stiegler argues that the lack (of knowledge) about the truth of the digital image is 
what enables the possibility of new knowledges about the image. The deception of 
“standards” that leads to limited or even no seeing can theoretically be argued to be 
productive for new knowledge about images. But as Kittler argues, any possibility of 
“illusion,” manipulation or lack, as experienced by the spectator, only exists in so far as a 
dimension of reality is removed in representation.354 For instance, painting resorts to the 
depiction of three dimensions on a two-dimensional surface leaving a dimension for 
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imagination along with the possibility of manipulation or distortion.355 But the bits of 
pixels have zero dimensions as they are made of binaries -1, 0. Here there is no “danger 
of concealment” or of a lack as there are only two options of of either the positive or the 
negative. The bit as a binary code is the basis of knowledge as “information” that can be 
processed and communicated with the most precise accuracy in the “closed worlds” of 
the military and beyond, and importantly for communication between machines.  
This condition of no “illusion” in the form of digital images is also true of the 
seeing in the consumer’s mediated world. Firstly, “visual culture” presents the real as 
though there was no “representation.” 356 Such a reproduction of the “real” and its 
“devouring immediacy” have left no room for illusion.357 The only illusion that can be is 
the illusion of perfect reproducibility (analogous to perfect communication of control 
systems). This reproduction is carried out endlessly in 24-7 news channels, real-time 
broadcasts and the constant deluge of visual media. This is the state that Baudrillard calls 
the “pornographic hypervisible.”358 In this state of seeing all and seeing all the time, no 
seeing can occur.  
On the other hand, images available to consumers through the media are a far cry 
from the sophistication of digital technologies and its synthetic possibilities. A well-
known author of books on computer graphics and animations Alan Watt illustrates this 
situation with one of the first instances of visual effects in media. In the movie “Death 
becomes Her” the actress Meryl Streep is shown with her head twisted so the back of her 
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head faces forward.359 Watt notes that not only is this effect “banal and artless” but at the 
same time it uses some of the most sophisticated mathematical and algorithmic 
discoveries. This paradoxical situation is not uncommon either.360 These are the kinds of 
computer graphics (synthetic images) that “most inhabitants of the planet” are seeing, he 
observes.361 The poverty of such images is unworthy of the hope of abounding 
possibilities of new perceptions, new intentions and new intuitive knowledges that 
Stiegler describes.  
 
4. Technicisation and Stiegler’s hope 
 
It should be clear from the discussion so far that the radical possibilities that 
Stiegler proposes do not derive from the contemporary situation. In so far as Stiegler's 
thought is concerned with human perceptual and knowledge capacities, his philosophy is 
not indifferent to the human being as the imaginations (and imperatives) of techno- 
science tend to be nor are they “adversarial” to humans as is the case with commercial 
media operations.  Also, Stiegler, as noted earlier, is careful to delienate the specificity of 
current conditions in terms of the unprecedented speed of technical evolution and the 
adverse, disorienting effects that mark the present age. Such discontinuities suggest an 
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alternative source to Stiegler’s optimism.362 The comparison with Greek civilisation in 
‘The Discrete Image’ is instructive in this regard.  
It will been argued in this last section that although the self-animated technical 
beings of contemporary techno-science inform Stiegler's notion of “technics,” the radical 
possibilities he proposes are based on realities of an older time period. Specifically, his 
vision of a positive future given by contemporary technologies comes from conceiving 
them in relation to a set of processes and effects true at an earlier time. By considering 
Stiegler’s own thesis on technics and his theory of technical evolution we can see why 
and how this may be the case.  
The process of technicisation as noted in Chapter 1, is central to Stiegler’s 
concept of technics and its relation to man. Stiegler defines techincs as an “exteriorised 
memory.” It is the means of inscription by which individual experiences are constituted 
and accessed or “read” at a later time. For instance, Stiegler argues that it is through 
alphabetic writing (a form of inscription) that knowledge of ideal forms in geometry or 
the thought of Greek philosophers is available. It is through the creation of a dynamic 
memory store that forms of technics are able to give all human possibilities in advance 
and open up new avenues of knowledge as well.  
Stiegler’s concept of technical evolution consists of two concepts. Firstly, the 
speed of technical evolution, Stiegler argues, has always had acceleration at its heart.363 
Secondly, all opening up of new possibilities always also implies foreclosures of other 
possibilities. Stiegler writes that all “innovation is inevitably accompanied by 
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obsolescence.”364 Here obsolescence can be understood as a means of disorientation since 
obsolescence results in the loss of cardinal markers or structures of references that orient 
man.  
These two aspects of technical evolution imply a fundamental distinction between 
earlier human experiences and conditions and those of the current era. In the introduction 
of the second volume of Technics and Time, Stiegler writes that until the Industrial 
Revolution the pace of technical evolution was significantly slower and people 
experienced change differently: “Change was such an exception (in a person’s lifetime) 
that it seemed to be an illusion.”365 The slower pace of evolution also implied that the rate 
of obsolesce was much slower too. As a result of this, there existed a basis for “reading” 
the past in such ways that could transform the present and open future possibilities. The 
instance given earlier of various applications of the steam engine being discovered a 
whole generation after the invention of the engine illustrates how Stiegler’s process of 
technicisation operates. The new generation of inventors and innovators benefited from 
the legacy of James Watt’s invention and the access to the latter’s patent opened up 
varied ways of putting the steam engine to use. This was possible because the steam 
engine had not been replaced by a newer technology and steam power remained relevant 
to other processes over the course of more than three decades. In this case, the pace at 
which systems and knowledges were being rendered obsolete did not imperil the 
possibilities opened by new technics. The inheritance or specter of the past, in the above 
instance, did give the possibilities for the inventions and innovations at a later time 
period.   
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But the process of technical change in current times is markedly accelerated, in 
Stiegler’s own admission. This implies that new forms of inscribing the past are also 
being made available at the same pace. And the rate of obsolescence too has rapidly 
increased. It may be the case that the increased rate of obsolescence has seriously 
endangered the realisation of possibilities opened up by modern technics. Past knowledge 
then would no longer be usefully rendered in relation to the present. Such an erosion of 
any meaningful relation to a “past” is, arguably, what Stiegler sees as the acute 
disorientation of current times where “cardinal orientation” is not occurring. The access 
and transformation of past knowledge that could orient the present and also thereby open 
new knowledge and future possibilities, is not taking place.  To this effect, one must add 
the condition that today disorientation has also produced “sickness” in society and 
democracy seems imperiled. These are Stiegler’s observations of the current conditions. 
The pace of change has evidently overwhelmed both the human and the social 
organisation he exists within. New knowledge, intentions and critical capacities of the 
kind that Stiegler describes, although urgent in these circumstances, could not have been 
imagined with these desperate conditions in mind.    
Stiegler's suggestion of an optimistic future comes instead from looking back to 
an older time. But this extrapolation is contradictory to Stiegler’s own account of present 
day disorientations and their effects on human society. The extrapolation of processes 
true of another time period to present situations may imply hope that such processes 
might prevail despite existing conditions. But the basis of the hope has to be questioned 
in light of the conditions that may well have imperiled (or even rendered obsolete) the 
said processes and the human, or more appropriately consumer, capability of inscribing 
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pasts and futures given the over-determinations and dynamics particular to modern 
technics.  
In this chapter, I have argued that new technics have specters of their own and 
inherit a legacy of control and closed world visions. The imperatives of military, industry 
and scientific research have over-determined the forms of modern technics, which also 
come marked by the self-reinforcing dynamic moving towards greater automation and 
higher performance. This renders these technologies less and less available to human 
access and comprehension. On the other hand, as depicted in Chapter 2, the contemporary 
human condition is over-determined and given in advance by the mediated world of 
techno-animated toys and various “options” or indexes. Humans are adopting the 
language of objects and indexes to define their reality, their selfs and human relations as 
well as all meaningful experience and knowledge. These conditions have produced 
sickness in society, as Stiegler himself notes. Both from the perspective of technics and 
humans Stiegler’s hope appears untenable, perhaps even absurd.  
In a rare moment of doubt in ‘The Discrete Image,’ Stiegler suggests that this 
hope may not be within reach. Speaking about the possibility of a critical consciousness 
he states: “(But I’m not sure that this kind of consciousness is as possible as one might 
wish)…” 366 This moment is outside the movement of the text and exists in a brief 
parenthesis. This reveals the extent of optimism that the text remains committed to. 
Forgoing the opportunity of analysing this doubt, Stiegler continues hailing the future of 
digital technology. But the urgent uptake of new technics that he advocates could only 
feed the “disorientation” that already exists, withdrawing further any possibility of 
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finding one's orientation let alone engendering new possibilities of knowledge or 
intentions.  
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Epilogue 
We try to see the best we can, hoping our intuitions and insights provide 
illumination.367  - Frank Stella  
 
Modern technics, Stiegler argues, have created the means for spectators to carry 
out the analysis and synthesis of images that were previously only in the domain of 
producers of images such as artists and filmmakers. More importantly perhaps, Stiegler 
argues that the gaze of spectators would be transformed with these means and new 
intentions as well as knowledge about the visible worlds will become possible. These, 
arguably, have always been the prerogatives of visual art. It can be suggested then that 
the future that Stiegler envisions is one indebted to art and belongs emphatically to the 
domain of artistic creation.  
In the concluding section of the third chapter I have suggested that Stiegler’s 
optimistic thesis of a new visual literacy and knowledge does not arise from 
contemplating the present but that it stems from the understanding of an earlier time 
period. Stiegler consistently evokes the instance of ancient Greece and the advent of 
writing in its context to illustrate how technics open up new possibilities of knowledge in 
‘The Discrete Image’ and in his other texts too. Also, Stiegler admits that his thought is 
close to that of Heidegger who, not incidentally, also mobilises Greek concepts, 
specifically techne, for discussing modern technology.368 Heidegger emphasises art as a 
form of techne that is exemplary for revealing or opening new possibilities. It may well 
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be that Heidegger, through his conception of Greek techne, opens the path  for Stiegler 
and possibly others too to imagine the productive dimensions of techne (as art) for human 
knowledge, experience and existence. It will be argued here that the glorious future of 
new visual possibilities that Stiegler suggests could be grasped in its fullest measure and 
even rendered possible through techne as artistic creation of a specific modality as 
conceived by Heidegger. 
Heidegger observes that techne was a fundamental word in Greek language and 
that “special meditations” have even been devoted to “its signification and to the matter 
signified in it.”369 Techne can be broadly understood as a form of poesis or productive 
endeavour. Everything in the fine arts, poetry and the “arts of the mind,” but also the 
work of craftsmen and any means of constructing things, Heidegger observes, bears the 
“modest” name of techne.370 What Heidegger is drawing attention to is the application of 
the word techne to the broadest realm of human activities in Greece and identifying from 
this the significance of techne as a crucial modality of human endeavours at the time.  
This, as suggested in the opening chapter, is the basis of Stiegler’s generalisation 
of technics to include all skills, techniques and human actions. But Heidegger does not 
conceive techne as an originarily given condition or as something intrinsic to the human 
constitution. Techncs specified a modality of creation in his interpretation. This is 
crucially different from Stiegler’s conception of technics. Stiegler’s insistence that 
writing as a technique lead to the epistemological consequences of sciences, philosophy 
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and other subjects for instance overlooks the structures and processes that were crucial in 
bringing about these gains. For instance, grammar and rhetoric were among the core 
subjects taught in the school curriculum of late antiquity and presumably this helped 
foster the cultivation of linguistic and analytic ability.371 A more precise understanding of 
the practice of writing is arguably grasped with Heidegger’s concept of techne that 
includes the undertaking of a process through learning and practice. Stiegler’s conception 
of technics on the other hand precludes the intent and the work of learning technics or 
techne.     
Heidegger states further that through its root word tikto, techne belongs to 
“bringing-forth.”372 “Bringing-forth” refers to the revealing or making visible of that 
which may otherwise lie concealed. Such “bringing-forth” of the highest sense is seen in 
the emergence of things from themselves, or what is called phusis, in nature.373 The rising 
of the sun is an instance of phusis. Phusis is “Being itself, by virtue of which beings first 
become and remain observable.”374 “Being” here can be understood as an “essence” 
which is not reducible to an innate quality in objects and living things. It is made 
manifest only through a doing or an occurrence. After manifesting, Being “persists” such 
that it holds “sway.” The unfolding of Being or bringing-forth of phusis is the space of 
truth (aletheia).375 What is brought-forth and that which holds sway in phusis is truth as 
unconcealment. For Heidegger the very concept of truth in Greece is unthinkable without 
the essential relation it shares with phusis. Techne as a kind of bringing-forth suggests 
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that the art of creation is also linked to truth as aletheia in a similar way. We may 
understand this as the direct relation of techne and all knowledge that it brings-forth and 
makes accessible.376 This is similar to Stiegler’s argument in so far as technicisation gives 
the means for realising new knowledge by providing access to and constituting memory 
or the past.  
Heidegger argues too that it was through the definitive work of the techne of 
poetry and thought that phusis was revealed to the Greeks.377 Techne has this privileged 
role because this is the place where the being (of the artist) is “put to work” and “the 
emerging that holds sway, phusis, comes to seem.”378 It is through the work of techne, 
Heidegger claims, that: 
…everything else that appears and that we can find around us first becomes 
confirmed and accessible, interpretable and understandable, as a being, or else as 
an unbeing.379   
Here, Heidegger states the primacy of art as the activity that produces or rather 
unconceals the Greek understanding of “Being” (phusis) and therefore also of truth 
(aletheia). In his interpretation, techne as art provides the definitive understanding that 
grounds the experience and knowledge of Greek thought  
In Stiegler’s conception of technics too it is through technicisation (or the 
inscription of memory using technics) that all human conditions are revealed, given in 
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advance as well as all avenues of knowledge opened up. To that end, Stiegler’s technics 
is similar in conception to Heidegger’s techne. But the difference as suggested earlier is 
that for Heidegger techne is a specific modality of creation that implies learning and 
doing. Stiegler insists instead that technics operate on an autonomous self-evolving basis 
and create the said possibilities independent of human intention or involvement.  
It will be argued here that the possibilities that Stiegler describes in ‘The Discrete 
Image’ can be grasped in the realm of artistic creation of the kind that Heidegger 
elaborates. The undertaking of this form of techne, it will be argued, would reveal how 
the transformation of perception and new visual knowledge can occur. In what follows 
the kind of doing that occurs in techne will be explicated and further illustrated with an 
instance from visual art.  
 
Techne in general could be defined as a “bringing-forth” not in itself as in phusis 
(a flower blooms out of itself for instance) but as a bringing-forth of something other than 
itself.380 Techne brings forth that which was not available for apprehension before.381 
“Bringing-forth” implies “bringing something into presence” in accordance to its 
“essence” or the “persisting sway” of its Being. This is achieved when all four causes - 
the material, the concept, the creator and the telos (goal) of the creation- together achieve 
the object in question. 
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Creation of this kind involves a particular way of “being responsible” and an 
“indebtedness” through which things are “set free” and started on their “way into arrival” 
or are revealed.382 It is in this sense that “techne” or creation “supports and guides” all 
“comportment towards beings.”383 Causality here has to be understood as one of the artist 
“being responsible” in setting something on its course into appearance. The indebtedness 
and responsibility involved in such creation are also present in Stiegler's account of 
technicisation. The specters of the past that indebt human beings and that also address 
them or concern them without reciprocity, Stiegler argues, are transmitted through the 
process of technicisation (See chapter 1). But this occurs without man being engaged in 
any process that requires knowledge, learning and doing. 
Techne, Heidegger argues too, is “a mode of knowing.”384 Knowing here is not 
observing or collecting facts but “initially and constantly…going beyond” what is 
immediately present.385 In its “decisive” trait, techne is a “violence doing” that is 
necessary to overcome the “overwhelming sway” of what presents itself to the human.386 
Deinon, the Greek term for violence has two dimensions that bear a “reciprocal relation” 
to one another, writes Heidegger. One dimension is “doing violence” which is 
encapsulated in the term techne and the other is the “pervasive sway” (as in being), which 
is encapsulated in dike or the structure or arrangement that “compels compliance.”387 
Heidegger explains that “techne breaks out against dike.”388 The techne of creation is the 
destructive act of surpassing what is given, exists or imposes itself. With techne, we may 
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say that humans are involved in endeavoring to surpass the overwhelming character of 
one’s time and its historical reality. This however does not involve a heroic or 
superhuman task rather the struggle against one’s time occurs within the particular task of 
creation and in relation to it. 
Dike is not a reference to inanimate structures or norms but is “the overwhelming 
of beings as a whole.” 389 The “violence-doing Dasein,” or the human being, struggles 
against this. The violence of techne even as it surpasses also simultaneously sets down 
paths that encumber further violence. Human beings at large are caught in such defined 
routes and become a part of that which then imposes itself as the overwhelming sway. 
The knowing violence of techne has to be carried out anew each time as a result. This 
exposition points to the daunting nature of opposition that exists when techne is carried 
for creation of this kind is set against other beings (masses) as well as existing structures. 
Heidegger notes that dike has all techne at “its disposal” which is to say it has access to 
all means of creation (destruction) imaginable. This is part of the reason why by its very 
nature dike “compels fitting-in and compliance.”390  
The juxtaposition of the Dasein as the violence-doing Being against all other 
Beings is not to insist on anthropocentrism. Heidegger emphasises that the human does 
not get beyond his times through an “application of human faculties.”391 The violence-
doing Dasein “finds his way into the overwhelming.”392This is to say the violent 
opposition does not occur at will but that it requires a certain necessity. As indicated 
earlier, techne involves “being responsible,” where things are set on their way to 
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completion.393 The “violence” of techne is in relation to dike and does not pertain to or 
describe the process of creation itself. 
Through such creation or techne an “opening up” occurs. Techne “surpasses” and 
“sets to work the advance” that marks the limits of that which is present at hand.394 This 
implies that the operative violence of creation, which breaks from the constraints of its 
time and space in history, creates the space that transforms the understanding of all that 
exists in its own time. This is how new possibilities reveal themselves. For the Greeks art 
was this techne in an “emphatic sense.”395 In techne, as Heidegger interprets it, the 
human being creates the opening for the futures and does so by risking or going against 
the grain of his times. The possibilities of new futures and new knowledge as in ‘The 
Discrete Image’ do not arise out of the debt of the past alone but through the overcoming 
of the present. This is an important conclusion for if admittedly the possibility of 
intelligent apprehension of images is impeded by over-determinations of the forms of 
technology and the mental world of consumers by control imperatives, the surpassing that 
techne achieves is precisely what would be necessary for the said possibility to be 
realised, or for the possibility to even exist. What is involved in such surpassing and how 
the opening of futures can take place can be seen more clearly with an instance from 
visual art.  
This instance describes what new intentions may be in relation to perceiving an 
image object and how these intentions may open up new possibilities or avenues. The 
discussion that follows presents two such intentions – that of the Italian painter 
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Caravaggio who perceived a new and independent space of and for painting and revealed 
it through his artworks and that of another artist Frank Stella who reveals the 
achievements of Caravaggio through his perception of the latter’s artworks. In both cases 
it will be noted that there is a distinctive opening or revealing of new possibilities using a 
new intention or perception. But also more crucially, in each case the new intention is a 
surpassing or overcoming of given conditions, existing knowledge and possibilities for 
creation (and perception). Through the example of Stella and Caravaggio Stiegler’s 
possibilities of a transformation of perception will be pictured and it will be evident that 
artistic creation of a particular kind creates these possibilities and also realises them.  
 
The American artist Frank Stella describes an invention made by Caravaggio in 
17th century Italy that freed painting to exist in a realm of its own, truly and for the first 
time in history. This invention was that of “pictorial space”- a space created in paintings 
where “the subjects of the painting could live.”396 This space did not “end at the framing 
edges... of the painting” but projected a space that seemed expansive even beyond the 
depicted action.397 A spectator was able to not only look into the scene of a painting but 
also feel his way inside it and around its subjects.398 With this new space, painting did not 
need architecture to exist let alone borrow the space that architecture created. The new 
pictorial space had liberated painting and made it truly self-sufficient. The invention of 
Caravaggio as Stella perceives it is a bringing-forth or revealing.  
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Before Caravaggio, Stella notes, painting only created spaces to “tell a story or set 
an action” but these spaces could not expand or extend themselves in both palpable and 
imaginative realms.399 The invention of Caravaggio consisted in creating a “functional” 
pictoriality that could be wielded to great effect and with telling efficacy to provoke a 
response to the totality of the painting. This is seen in the painting Saint John the Baptist. 
Caravaggio’s painting of the young saint offers a closeness to the body that is “kissable 
and carresable.”400 The aura of the saint is unmistaken in the rounded space that the 
painting projects. Stella provides the image of a gyroscope to clearly envision what this 
pictorial space looks like. The spectator feels a sense of being inside a spinning sphere 
experiencing the “moment and motion” of the “painting’s action.”401 Stella’s perception 
here is also a bringing-forth that reveals the pictorial space of Caravaggio’s paintings 
both by constituting it through the image of the gyroscope and also rendering it accessible 
through such constitution.  
The accomplishment of Caravaggio's pictoriality consisted in the creation of an 
independent space, which was not conceptually, or in a real sense dependent on 
architecture, sculptural space and natural realism. These three were the common options 
for pictorial space at that time. For instance, many paintings at the time had a carousel-
like composition that was derived from the predominantly vertical composition of 
sculptures. Pictorial space until then had been bound by architecture both physically and 
imaginatively. In this instance the freedom won by Caravaggio was decisive – by freeing 
painting from surfaces in existing architecture, painting was finally free from the bounds 
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of illustration and decoration. The new space achieved a new spatiality that future 
painting could work with. But more importantly perhaps, its self-sufficiency freed it from 
architectures of church and state and aspired to a domain of its own, paving way for the 
art museum. This is also the invention, Stella argues, that makes possible the “living 
space” one sees in paintings of Reuben, Rembrandt and Velasquez, but also the inventive 
space of Manet, and through Manet, Caravaggio’s pictoriality makes room for the works 
of Mondrian and Pollock.402 The achievement of the new pictorial space opened up by 
Caravaggio is seen in the fact that it has set the standard with which all art before and 
after is evaluated today, writes Stella.403 In the above description, we can apprehend how 
the revealing of this new spatiality created an advance that made the achievement of 
future artists and arguably also the future of art possible. This is perhaps how Stiegler 
(through the work of Derrida) understands specters to be operating - by indebting and 
addressing all those who come after and also becoming at the same time their condition 
of freedom.  
But as indicated earlier the important conclusion that we may draw from 
Heidegger’s techne that has consequences for the possibilities in ‘The Discrete Image’ is 
that techne is a doing that surpasses what is present and overcomes the overwhelming 
character of its time.  The pictoriality of Caravaggio too had to be achieved through such 
surpassing and going beyond in more ways than one.  
Perception is one such limitation that plagues the artist who seeks to create. Stella 
states that the difficulty of seeing what is created in a painting “does not surprise us” 
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given that the artist from the moment he has his eyes open “worries that there is 
something present that he cannot quite see.”404 The act of creation is the involved 
struggle driven by the uncertain promise of finally overcoming such limitations of sight 
itself. This is why the question of perception and gaze that Stiegler describes in ‘The 
Discrete Image’ belongs most tellingly to pursuits of visual art.  
The resolution of this struggle to overcome the limits of perception is the creation 
of an artwork. In this case the spherical space of Caravaggio overcomes the limits of 
perception by rendering a space that is flexible but well contained. In this new space 
Caravaggio can see what occurs in a coherently rounded pictoriality. The creation of the 
work of art in this sense is the transformation of the gaze. Such doing or creation is what 
brings about the possibility of a different kind of seeing- a new intention.  
In creating his radical pictoriality, Caravaggio “had to change the way things were 
done in painting in the late 16th century.”405 One of the problems with earlier art was that 
artists accepted the surfaces given to them and were satisfied with accepting 
“commissioned” work.406 But Caravaggio affected changes in the relationship of painting 
to patronage. He also changed the way artists related to their work. He created a working 
space inside his studio turning it into a “cathedral of the self (artist).”407 The studio 
became the space for the experiments that shaped the vision and creations of Caravaggio. 
The realistic illusion of Caravaggio's paintings is one that he carefully orchestrates in 
flesh and in doing this, critics note, he made unusual demands of his models. The “living 
theatre” in Caravaggio’s paintings is born of the intentional direction of the studio 
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space.408 For the new kind of pictoriality to be brought forth, bounds within which 
painting had operated had to be surpassed, both physically and in terms of structures of 
organization. The bounds from within which artists conducted themselves in relation to 
their art had to be overcome too. This is how conceivably, the overcoming of dike in 
Heidegger’s interpretation occurs. It can be said then that Caravaggio’s creations that 
brought forth the new pictorial space enacted the violence of techne that Heidegger 
pictures.  
Stella's reading too is a kind of violence-doing that had to surpass its times in 
revealing Caravaggio’s pictoriality. Stella's reading of Caravaggio is “idiosyncratic” as 
some critics note.409 Noted art critic and philosopher Arthur Danto writes that it is a 
“tribute” to Stella that he sees the space in Caravaggio's creations.410 Art historian 
Stephen Campbell admits the improbability of seeing what Stella sees. He suggests that 
what Stella is able to see in Caravaggio’s works “may well elude the rest of us.”411 Stella 
notes that Caravaggio's work was “passionately denounced” in his own time. 412 To 
reveal the pictoriality in Caravaggio’s creations Stella had to constitute it through an 
original perception of the former’s paintings. Stella’s perception of this space could also 
be indebted to his altogether new organisation and approach to art within his own 
practice. The painting on the cover of the book Working Space, from which the above 
discussion of Caravaggio’s works derives, features one of Stella’s works that is an 
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instance of such violence as Caravaggio enacts in his practice. Stella’s painting quite 
literally constitutes itself through the deliberate, physical demolition of the ground below.  
Lastly, the revealing in Stella's vision and in Caravaggio's space comes from 
“indebtedness” and “being responsible” to the past. In a separate lecture Stella states:  
I believe that if I look at painting properly and try to understand its development 
throughout this century, we will find in our past a way of dealing with our own 
pressing problems.413  
What he finds instructive about the older painters was “their ability to reach back into the 
past to find ways to deal with their immediate worries about painting” and how their 
work took “complex turns” in relation to painting and art that went before them.414 In 
much the same way Stella's perception of Caravaggio’s works could be indebted to the 
genius of past painters- Monet, Mondrian and others- whose works Stella frequently 
mentions. As an artist who came after others like Pollock, Stella had inherited the legacy 
of the bold experimentation of post World War II abstraction as well.  
The creation of pictorial space for Caravaggio was also made possible by a 
similar advance of the past. He received indications from Leonardo’s and Michelangelo’s 
attempts to free painting from architecture. Caravaggio's success also owed to Raphael, 
notes Stella. Stella argues that Caravaggio and Rubens are “great builders of the past” in 
accessing and realising the possibilities in Raphael.415 Raphael’s pictoriality, Stella notes, 
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is what inspires and is given full expression in Caravaggio's works.416 Caravaggio's 
creation can be seen as directing the influences of art in the Renaissance period by 
fulfilling what was possibly set in play in the legacy of art that he had inherited. In this 
sense, his practice can be understood as Heidegger’s techne.  
The philosopher John Dewey describes the role of the past in creating an advance 
for future possibilities:  
When a flash of lightning illuminates a dark landscape, there is a momentary 
recognition of objects. But the recognition…is the focal culmination of long, slow 
processes of maturation…The past is carried into the present so as to expand and 
deepen the content of the latter.417  
Another philosopher William James defines such a body of the past that influences the 
present as the “apperceiving mass” or the “apriori factor” in psychology.418 This may 
well be how an advance occurs when specters of the past give the clarity of perception in 
the present and open futures. This is also how Stiegler describes new perception or 
intention in ‘The Discrete Image.’ 
Caravaggio’s invention and Stella’s vision illustrate the techne of creation that 
Heidegger conceives of. The new perceptions, knowledge and radical futures that Stiegler 
describes may be possible for those involved in such processes of creation as described 
above - creation that involves going beyond what is at hand, surpassing the constraints of 
one’s time and realising the debt of the past that one is endowed with. 
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